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Switched at the Fertility Clinic: Determining
Maternal Rights When a Child is Born from
Stolen or Misdelivered Genetic Material
Alice M. Noble-Allgire*
In the beginning, they were one of the happy statistics from a California
fertility clinic. Among the twenty percent of infertile couples whose treatments
resulted in a successful pregnancy,1 they were doubly blessed, in fact, with

twins.' Six years later, however, a letter in the mailbox turned their lives upside
down. Although apologetic in tone, the letter suggested that the unthinkable had
occurred and requested that the twins be submitted for genetic testing to
determine whether they were born from another woman's eggs.3

*Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law; B.S.
1980, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville; J.D. 1990, Southern Illinois
University at Carbondale. The Author wishes to express appreciation to colleagues
Wenona Whitfield and Rebecca O'Neill for their reviews and suggestions, to law
students Vickie Brady, Heidi Hildebrand, and Dennis Steeves for their research and
editorial assistance, and to all of the friends, family, and legal writing students who
shared their feelings on the subject and helped the Author understand the wide variety
of viewpoints on this very personal and emotional topic.
1. A recent government report of fertility clinics across the country found that
19.6% of all treatment cycles resulted in a live birth when using fresh embryos from
nondonor eggs. NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH
PROMOTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 1995 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES -NATIONAL

SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS

35 (1997). "Often called the 'take-home baby rate,' this is the rate that most people are
interested in when deciding whether or not to use [assisted reproductive technology]."
Id. at 11.
2. Jill Smolowe & Tara Weingarten, The Test-Tube Custody Fight-Victimsof the
Irvine Stolen-Egg ScandalGo After Twins, TIME, Mar. 18, 1996, at 80, available in 1996
WL 8824986.
3. Id. The letter was reprinted in full in the Orange County Register with the
names of the birth parents and the children deleted. Susan Kelleher & Kim Christensen,
Fertility Patients Fight Over Twins, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 18, 1996, at Al,
available
in 1996 WLof7012307.
Published
by University
Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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The letter was sent on behalf of another California couple, Loretta and
Basilio Jorge, who had sought assistance from the same fertility clinic used by
the birth parents.4 Following up on reports of misconduct at the clinic, an
attorney found evidence that Mrs. Jorge's eggs were implanted without her
consent in the woman who gave birth to the twins.' The attorney sent the letter
informing the birth parents that the Jorges "do not want to unduly disrupt your
lives" but would like to begin establishing a relationship with the children. n
Unfortunatcly, theirs was not an isolated case. An investigation revealed
that clinic physicians made a practice of taking their clients' eggs or embryos
without permission More than one hundred civil suits have been filed against
the clinic by patients who alleged their eggs or embryos were used to impregnate
other women. Officials believe at least fifteen children were born as a result of

4. Kelleher & Christensen, supra note 3, at Al.
5. Id.
6. Id. The birth mother was understandably outraged, telling a reporter: "I don't
want to talk about it. These were my eggs!" Id. Some members of the public were
outraged as well, sending hate mail and making angry phone calls to both the Jorges and
their attorneys. Valerie Godines, Lawyers in UCI Egg Scandal Take Their Places,
RIVERSIDE (CAL.) PRESS-ENTERPRISE, March 25, 1996, at BI, available in 1996 WL
3272957; Smolowe & Weingarten, supra note 2, at 80.
7. Although many of the women, like Mrs. Jorge, had consented to the removal of
their eggs for use in their own infertility treatment, they did not give permission for their
eggs or embryos created from their eggs to be used to impregnate other patients.
Kelleher & Christensen, supra note 3, at Al (the Jorges signed a form directing that all
of Mrs. Jorge's eggs be fertilized with Mr. Jorge's sperm and used by them to achieve
pregnancy). In more egregious cases, the clinic physicians surreptitiously removed eggs
from patients during diagnostic procedures. See Kim Christensen & Michelle Nicolosi,
Money Doesn'tBuy Relief, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 16, 1997, at B2, available in
1997 WL 7438488 (discussing lawsuit by woman who discovered that eggs were taken
from her during a routine laparoscopy and implanted in another woman).
8. Susan Kelleher & Kim Christensen, Stone Says PartnersKnew ofEgg Thefts,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Mar. 18, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 2618519. The
University of California at Irvine, which operated the now defunct Center for
Reproductive Health, has paid out more than $21 million as a result of settlements so far.
Id.
The settlements are being calculated through a formula, with the highest award of
damages to claimants like Mrs. Jorge, who had failed to conceive children of their own
but whose eggs were implanted in another woman who gave birth. Marcida Dodson, 21
More Claims Against UCI's Fertility Clinic Settledfor $4.4 Million, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1997, at B4, available in 1997 WL 13985501; Christensen & Nicolosi, supra note 7, at
B2 (describing the formula in detail). The Jorges' settlement was reported at $650,000.
Couple Settlesfor $650,000 in FertilitySuit, RIVERSIDE (CAL.) PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Sept.
28, 1997, at B3, available in 1997 WL 13966194.
Federal prosecutors, meanwhile, have filed charges against the clinic physicians.
See Kim Christensen et al., Dr.Asch Indicted in Egg Thefts, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Nov.
19,https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
1997, at Al, availablein 1997 WL 14885427 (20-count indictment alleges that clinic
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improper transfers. 9 Three custody suits are pending, including the highly

publicized claim of the Jorges.' 0
In many respects, the Jorges' case mirrors the legal drama presented by
"switched at birth" cases such as Twigg v. Mays." Ernest and Regina Twigg
claimed that hospital staff switched their newborn daughter with a baby girl born
to Barbara and Robert Mays on approximately the same date. The switch went
unnoticed until Arlena, the child raised by the Twiggs, died from a congenital
heart condition approximately ten years later. 3 The Twiggs found Kimberly
Mays through hospital records and filed a civil action seeking a declaration that
she was their biological daughter.' 4 A similar case was reported in Virginia in
1998, when paternity tests in a child support case suggested that two baby girls
5
had gone home with the wrong mothers after their births three years earlier.'
One significant factor distinguishes the "switched at birth" cases from the
Jorges' situation, however. The former cases occurred at the hospital after the
children were born. In the Jorges' case, the switch occurred at the fertility clinic.
Thus, unlike the Twiggs, the Jorges' battle is not over children that Loretta Jorge
both conceived and carried to term. Instead, she is claiming parental rights to

physician committed federal mail fraud when taking patients' eggs without their

consent).
9. Kelleher & Christensen, supra note 8, at Al.
10. Couple Settles for $650,000 in Fertility Suit, RIVERSIDE (CAL.) PRESSENTERPRISE, Sept. 28, 1997, at B3, available in 1997 WL 13966194.

11. No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993). The case
was documented in a two-part television miniseries titled Switched at Birth (NBC
television, April 28-29, 1991). The movie topped the Nielsen ratings for two weeks in
a row, eclipsing the two-hour final chapter of the night-time soap opera Dallas. Deborah
Hastings, NBC Wins Second Sweeps Week, AP, May 7, 1991, available in 1991 WL
6185051.
12. Mays v. Twigg, 543 So. 2d 241,242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
13. Id. Prior to Arlena's death, the Twiggs were informed that based upon Arlena's

blood type, neither of them could have been her natural parents. Id.
14. Id. For a discussion of how the Twiggs's case was resolved, see infra notes

358-63 and accompanying text.
15. The mothers, Paula Johnson and Whitney Rogers, gave birth one day apart at

the University of Virginia Medical Center in June 1995. Kin ofSwitched Babies Walk
Emotional Tightrope, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 9, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 2883920.
Johnson discovered the switch in July 1998, when paternity tests conducted as part of

child support proceedings showed that neither Johnson nor her former boyfriend were
the parents of Callie Marie, the child she had been raising. Id. Further investigation
suggested a mixup at the hospital between Callie Marie and another fair-haired baby,
Rebecca, who was being raised by Rogers and her partner, Kevin Chittum. Id.
Ironically, Rogers and Chittum were both killed in an automobile accident the day after
the error was discovered. Id. Lawsuits are pending to decide custody of the two
children. Michael D. Shear, Mother ofSwitched Baby Files Suitfor $31 Million, THE
WASH.by
POST,
May 25,of1999,
at BO1,
available
in 1999
WL 17004900.
Published
University
Missouri
School
of Law
Scholarship
Repository, 1999
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children that are her genetic offspring-the product of Mrs. Jorge's eggs-but
implanted in and gestated by the woman who ultimately gave birth to the twins.
The Jorges' lawsuit is the latest in a series of parental rights disputes
spawned by new reproductive technology. Because this new technology goes
beyond the natural means of procreation, it has strained the limits of traditional
parentage laws built upon the laws of nature. Until recently, there was no
question that the woman who gave birth to a child was the child's mother. That
conclusion was indisputable because pregnancy occurred only after sexual
intercourse in which the woman's egg was united, within her own body, with the
father's sperm. Modem reproductive technology has altered this biological
process, however, by allowing specialists to retrieve a woman's eggs and
fertilize them in a laboratory instead of a womb. The embryo is then implanted
immediately or frozen for implantation at a later date.
Tlis bifurcation of the procreation process has created a troublesome legal
dilemma: If one woman's eggs are implanted in another, which woman is the
child's "natural" or legal mother and thereby entitled to the rights and
responsibilities of parentage? Traditional parentage laws yield no easy answers
because they were crafted in simpler times. The legal community, therefore, has
struggled with this controversial question for more than a decade. Until the

California fertility clinic scandal, however, the issue arose only in the context
of
16
surrogacy arrangements, such as the highly publicized In re Baby M case.
An analysis of the surrogacy cases is helpful, but not dispositive, for
parentage disputes in cases like the Jorges', where one woman's eggs or
embryos are intentionally stolen or negligently misdelivered 17 to another woman.
Although both types of cases require a choice between a genetic mother and a
gestational mother, they are distinguishable on the basis of consent. In a
voluntary surrogacy, the surrogate has expressly agreed to gestate a child that
will be raised by another woman, a fact that has figured prominently in the legal
analysis that some courts and scholars have applied to these types of cases. But
such consent obviously is lacking in cases of theft or misdelivery of genetic
material, and the legal standards applied to cases of this sort must be modified
accordingly.
To determine the proper standard, this Article examines the evolution of
parentage laws, beginning in Section I with a review of the traditional common
law rules as applied to children conceived through natural sexual intercourse.
Section II examines how the law has responded to new reproductive technology,
focusing on disputes that have arisen from voluntary surrogacy arrangements.
16. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). See infra at 85-94.
17. Misdelivery occurs when a bailee surrenders bailed property to someone other
than the person entitled to it. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 999 (6th ed. 1990). As noted
below, some courts have found that a bailment exists when fertility clinics collect genetic
material from their patients and store it for later implantation. See infra note 187 and
accompanying text. The genetic material is therefore misdelivered when implanted in
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
someone
other than the genetic provider without the latter's consent.
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Section III analyzes these traditional and modem legal theories as they relate to
the special circumstances of stolen or misdelivered genetic material, and Section
IV concludes that the best method for resolving such cases is one that considers
8
both the intent of the prospective mothers and the best interests of the child.'
I. TRADITIONAL PARENTAGE LAWS BASED UPON NATURAL
PROCREATION
Prior to new reproductive technology, laws determining parentage and
parental rights flowed directly from the laws of nature. Although aided in part
by presumptions and tempered in some states by social policy, the general focus
of parentage laws was identification of a child's biological parent or parents.
Under the traditional common law, maternity was readily established by the
biological fact that pregnancy occurred only through natural sexual intercourse
between a man and a woman, resulting in a fetus carried by the woman. Thus,
maternity was established from the moment the woman gave birth, as recognized
by the ancient maxim mater est quam gestation demonstrat (by gestation the
mother is demonstrated). 9
Paternity was less easily confirmed, however, and courts were forced to rely
upon certain presumptions or social policy. The child's biological father
obviously was the man whose sperm fertilized the woman's egg, but prior to this
century, this biological fact was difficult to prove by objective means. Paternity,
therefore, was determined largely by the man's relationship with the woman who
gave birth, as recognized by the traditional English common law rule ofpater est
quem nuptiae demonstrant (the father is he whom the marriage points out).2"
Thus, when a married woman gave birth, the law presumed that her husband was
the father unless the husband could show that he was extra quatuor maria
(beyond the four seas or outside the kingdom of England) or that he otherwise

18. This Article focuses only on parentage issues that arise between two women
who have shared the biological functions necessary to produce a child-one providing
the egg and the other nurturing the egg through pregnancy. Some of the legal issues
discussed in this context may be applicable to other, related parentage questions, such as
the rights of a man whose sperm is used to produce the child. See Stephen Nohlgren,
Unusual Fightfor ParentalRights Could Shape Law, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, at IA,

availablein 1998 WL 4265742 (discussing custody battle between a child's mother and
a male acquaintance who provided sperm for the woman's artificial insemination at home
with turkey baster). Because those scenarios raise issues that are beyond the scope of this

Article, the author has not attempted to address those scenarios.
19. John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to be a "Parent"?The Claims of
Biology as the Basisfor ParentalRights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 370 (1991).
20. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *446 ("A legitimate child is he that

is born in lawful wedlock, or within a competent time afterwards. 'Paterest quem
nuptiae
is Missouri
the rule ofSchool
the civiloflaw
).
Published
bydemonstrant'
University of
Law....Scholarship
Repository, 1999
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did not have access to his wife for the preceding nine months.2 ' This marital
presumption served to protect the integrity and stability of the family but also
ensured legitimacy for the child in a time when illegitimacy was disfavored.
Determining parentage of children born outside wedlock was another
matter. The traditional English law labeled such childrenfiliusnullius (children

of no one) and denied them most of the legal rights granted to other children.22
Yet, the child's parents owed a duty of maintenance.' To identify the man liable
for such support, the court traditionally relied upon the sworn testimony of the
mother as conclusive evidence of paternity.24 More recently, however, states
began allowing the reputed father to attack the mother's claims by introducing
evidence that the mother had multiple sex partners during the relevant period.25

21. Id. at *457. Lord Mansfield recognized this presumption as irrebuttable, thus
prohibiting either spouse from testifying that the child born during the marriage was
illegitimate. Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1257-58 (1777) ("[lIt is a rule
founded in decency, morality, and policy, that they shall not be permitted to say after
marriage, that they have had no connection, and therefore that the offspring is
spurious .... ).
22. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *458-59 (stating that the rights of
an illegitimate child "are very few, being only such as he can acquire;for he can inherit
nothing, being looked upon as the son of nobody").
23. Id. at *457. Blackstone described this as a principle of natural law-"that there
is an obligation on every man to provide for those descended from his loins." Id. at
*448. It was codified in "An Act for the Setting of the Poor on Work and for the
Avoiding of Idleness" which provides:
[C]onceming Bastards begotten and born out of lawful Matrimony, (an
Offence against God's Law and Man's Law) the said Bastards being now left
to be kept at the Charges of the Parish where they be born, to the great Burden
of the same Parish, and in defrauding of the Relief of the impotent and aged
true Poor of the same Parish, and to the evil Example and Encouragement of
lewd Life: It is ordained and enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That two

Justices of the Peace, whereof one to be of the Quorum, in or next unto the
Limits where the Parish Church is, within which Parish such Bastard shall be
born, (upon Examination of the Cause and Circumstance,) shall and may by
their Discretion take Order as well for the Punishment of the Mother and

reputed Father of such Bastard Child, as also for the better Relief of every
such Parish in Part or in all; and shall and may likewise by such Discretion
take Order for the Keeping of every such Bastard Child, by charging such
Mother or reputed Father with the Payment of Money weekly or other
Sustentation for the Relief of such Child, in such wise as they shall think meet
and convenient ....
18 Eliz. 1, ch. 3, Section 2 (1576).
24. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *458.

25. Stephen L. Sass, The Defense of Multiple Access (Exceptio Plurium
Concubentium) in PaternitySuits: A ComparativeAnalysis, 51 TUL. L. REV. 468, 502
(1977). As Professor Sass explains, the mother's multiple sexual relations initially were
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
considered
irrelevant because "they did not exclude the defendant's paternity." Id. The
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Advances in medical technology have allowed courts to replace these forms
of proof with scientific evidence establishing a biological connection between
father and child. Blood testing was developed shortly after the turn of the
century, 26 allowing courts to establish non-paternity, i.e., to exclude a person
whose blood type indicated that he could not be the father.27 During the 1950s,
the rise of human leukocyte antigen (HLA) tests28 allowed experts to opine as to
the statistical probability that a particular male was the child's biological father.29
In more recent years, courts have been accepting deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
testing30 as an important tool for proving paternity. " DNA tests, when combined
law later developed to recognize multiple access as relevant. If the mother admitted to
having intercourse with more than one man during the period of conception, her paternity
suit against only one of her partners would be dismissed as a matter of law. Id. at 50203, 505. If she denied having multiple partners, however, the trier of fact resolved the
factual dispute based upon the credibility of the witnesses and available corroborative
evidence Id. at 505.
26. The earliest forms of blood testing were based upon the "blood group" of the
parent and child. The scientific principle behind this type of testing has been explained
as follows:
[B]lood can be distinguished because it contains different antigens. These
antigens may be detected by performing a series of chemical tests. Once these
antigens are detected, the blood may be classified into different groups. For
example, in the commonly known ABO blood grouping system, blood
containing antigen A is Group A, blood containing antigen B is Group B,
blood containing both antigens is Group AB, and blood which does not
contain any antigens is Group 0.
The science of genetics states that a child's blood group is a hereditary
trait acquired from either or both parents. Thus, a Group 0 mother and a Group 0 father
can only produce a Group 0 child because neither the A nor B antigen is present in either
parent. Moreover, a Group A mother and a Group 0 father could only produce either a
Group 0 or a Group A child, because all other groups would require the presence of the
B antigen in one of the parents. If a Group B child were born to a Group A mother, it
would be impossible for a Group 0 man to be the father because he would be lacking the
B antigen, and such a paternity action should be dismissed by the court.
E. Donald Shapiro et al., The DNA Paternity Test: Legislating The Future Paternity
Action, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 20-21 (1993).
27. Jean E. Maess, Annotation, Admissibility, Weight and Sufficiency of Human
Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) Tissue Typing Tests in PaternityCases, 37 A.L.1.4TH 167, 170
(1981).
28. The HLA test focuses on white blood cells, as compared to all other blood
group tests which test for antigens found in the red blood cells. Shapiro, supra note 26,
at 24. "While the different red blood cell tests can identify a small number of antigens,
HLA testing can identify twenty-one genetic markers. This makes the HLA test far
superior when compared to all the other blood grouping tests." Id.
29. Id.
30. While blood group testing focuses on certain properties of the blood cells
Published
by University
of delves
Missouri
School
Scholarship
1999
themselves,
DNA testing
directly
intooftheLaw
person's
genetic Repository,
code. For a description
...
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with other genetic marking tests such as standard blood grouping tests and HLA
tests, can produce a statistical probability of paternity purportedly in excess of
99.99 percent. 32
In short, biology has been one of the major factors underlying most
traditional parentage laws. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has found
that this biological connection gives rise to a constitutionally protected interest
"in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
34
children.. . ." The Court first recognized this interest in Stanley v. Illinois,
which involved an unwed father whose children were taken by the state after the
death of the children's natural mother. The Court noted that its previous
decisions had frequently emphasized the importance of the family:
The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed
'essential,' 'basic civil rights of man,' and '(r)ights far more precious
than property rights,' 'It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and

of how DNA evidence works, see Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility ofDNA
IdentificationEvidence, 84 A.L.R.4th 313, 319 (1991).

31. See Fleming, supra note 30, at 329 n.45 (listing cases). Some courts have
refused to allow DNA evidence either because their paternity statutes do not expressly
provide for such testing or because of questions about the reliability of the tests in a
particular case. See Alaska ex rel. Mattox v. Alaska ex rel. Neeson, 875 P.2d 763, 764
(Alaska 1994) (holding that trial court erred in admitting improperly authenticated DNA
test reports and in failing to determine whether DNA testing was scientifically accepted
or that procedures required to make tests valid had been followed); Franson v. Micelli,
645 N.E.2d 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that trial court in paternity proceeding erred

in admitting evidence of DNA testing to prove paternity, where court, having found that
underlying analytical techniques of DNA testing were generally accepted scientifically,

court did not make similar inquiry into far more controversial techniques of drawing
statistical probability conclusions from DNA testing), vacatedfor lack ofjurisdiction,
666 N.E.2d 1188 (111. 1996); Estate of Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536, 540 (Cal. Ct. App.

1992) (holding that trial court properly refused to allow DNA testing to determine
paternity in a probate proceeding because the Probate Code did not authorize the use of
DNA tests).
Some caution is warranted, however, because there is potential for error in
gathering, storing, and testing evidence. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Scientific Testing
and ProofofPaternity: Some Controversy andKey IssuesforFamily Law Counsel, 57
LA. L. REv. 379, 389, 397-416 (1997). Moreover, scientists and scholars are not in full
agreement regarding some of the genetic theories utilized in the probability calculations.
Id.
32. Shapiro, supra note 26, at 29; see also A.B. v. C.D., 690 N.E.2d 839, 843
(Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (blood and genetic marker test shows defendant's probability of
paternity was 99.62% using blood tests and 99.99% using DNA analysis); Turner v.
Mosca, 703 A.2d 1114, 1114 (R.I. 1997) (court-ordered genetic blood tests indicated a

99.99% probability of paternity).
33. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
34. Id.
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nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparations for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder.'35
As a matter of equal protection, the Court concluded that the State of Illinois
could not deprive Stanley of his parental rights absent a hearing finding him unfit
as a parent.36
Several subsequent Supreme Court cases have affirmed this constitutional
interest with qualifications. In Lehr v. Robertson,38 the Court emphasized a
distinction between "a mere biological relationship and an actual relationship of
' The Court stated that an unwed father's interest in
parental responsibility."39
his
child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause when he
"demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood ...."
The "mere existence of a biological link," on the other hand, "does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection." 41 Accordingly, the Court held that a

35. Id. (citations omitted).
36. Under Illinois dependency proceedings at the time, children were declared
wards of the state if they had no surviving parent or guardian. Id. at 649. The
dependency statute defined the term "parent" to mean "the father and mother of a
legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child,
and includes any adoptive parent ." Id. at 650. Accordingly, the father of an illegitimate
child was not considered a parent and his children automatically would be declared wards
of the state. Id. at 649-50. Where a child had living parents, by contrast, the state could
take custody of those children only after a hearing in which the parent(s) or guardian is
shown to be unfit. Id. at 649, 658. The Supreme Court concluded that "denying such a
hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting it to other Illinois parents is
inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 658.
37. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 248, 254 (1978) (recognizing that
"a father's interest in the 'companionship, care, custody, and management' of his
children is 'cognizable and substantial,"' but holding that the state did not infringe upon
this right by applying a "best interests of the child" standard to the unwed father's
attempt to block the child's adoption); cf Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979)
(invalidating on equal protection grounds a statute under which a man's children could
be adopted by their natural mother and her husband without the natural father's consent).

38. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
39. Id. at 259-60 (quoting Justice Stewart's dissent in Caban v. Mohammed, 441

U.S. 380, 397 (1979), that "[p]arental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring.").

40. Id. at 261.
41. Id. As the Court explained:

The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father
an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his
offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of
responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the
parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the
child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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putative father's constitutional rights were not violated by the state's failure to
provide him with notice of pending adoption proceedings when the man failed
to establish a substantial relationship with his child and failed to submit his name
to the state's putative father registry.42
The Court also has held that public policy may prevail over a biological
connection, as in the case of a married woman who conceives a child through
sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband.4 3 Although some states
allow the biological father to bring suit to establish paternity in this situation, 44
many still recognize the marital presumption (that the mother's husband is the
child's father) as a means of protecting the integrity of the family unit.4 In fact,
some states hold the marital presumption irrefutable.4 6 Others allow the

automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best
interests lie.
Id. at 262.
42. Id. at 262-64.
43. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); infra notes 48-57.
44. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.040, 26.26.060 (1997) (§ 26.26.060
provides that "a man alleged or alleging himself to be the father" has standing to bring
a paternity action and § 26.26.040 provides that any presumption of paternityincluding the marital presumption-may be "rebutted by a court decree establishing
paternity of the child by another man"); Smith v. Jones, 566 So. 2d 408 (La. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that a biological father can bring an avowal action to rebut the statutory
presumption of paternity in the mother's husband).
45. See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also Vincent B. v. Joan R., 179
Cal. Rptr. 9, 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that the conclusive presumption was based
on "a matter of overriding social policy, that given a certain relationship between the
husband and wife, the husband is to be held responsible for the child, and that the
integrity of the family unit should not be impugned"), appealdismissed, 459 U.S. 807
(1982); In re Marriage of Stephen B. and Sharyne, 177 Cal. Rptr. 429, 431-33 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981) (noting that the presumption was initially justified on the ground that
biological paternity was impossible to prove, but after paternity tests became reliable,
preservation of family integrity became the rule's paramount justification); In re
Marriage of Hodge, 713 P.2d 1071, 1072 (Or. Ct. App.) (stating that the legislature
enacted the conclusive presumption "to preserve family integrity and to protect children
of the family"), rev'd on other grounds, 722 P.2d 1235 (Or. 1986);.
46. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 109.070 (1997) (stating that "[tihe child of a wife
cohabiting with her husband who was not impotent or sterile at the time of the conception
of the child shall be conclusively presumed to be the child of her husband, whether or not
the marriage of the husband and wife may be void").
California's Family Code similarly states that "the child of a wife cohabiting with
her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the
marriage," CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 1994), but qualifies this by allowing blood
tests to determine that the husband is not the father in limited circumstances. Id. § 7541.
More specifically, the statute provides:
(a) Notwithstanding Section 7540, if the court finds that the conclusions
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based on blood tests performed
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presumption to be challenged by the presumed father, the mother, and the child,
but not by someone claiming to be the biological father.47

The Supreme Court upheld California's irrebuttable presumption against a
constitutional challenge in Michael H. v. GeraldD., in which a man claimed to
have fathered a child through an adulterous relationship with a married woman.'
At issue in MichaelH. was the application of California's custody and visitation
statute, which provides that aparent has a statutory right to visitation "unless it
is shown that such visitation would be detrimental to the best interests of the
child." 49 Non-parents-more specifically, "any other person having an interest
in the welfare of the child"-could obtain visitation rights only at the discretion
of the court." The plaintiff contended that he was a parent because blood tests

pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 7550), are that the husband
is not the father of the child, the question of paternity of the husband shall be
resolved accordingly.
(b) The notice of motion for blood tests under this section may be filed
not later than two years from the child's date of birth by the husband, or for
the purposes of establishing paternity by the presumed father or the child
through or by the child's guardian ad litem. As used in this subdivision,
"presumed father" has the meaning given in Sections 7611 and 7612.
(c) The notice of motion for blood tests under this section may be filed
by the mother of the child not later than two years from the child's date of
birth if the child's biological father has filed an affidavit with the court
acknowledging paternity of the child.
(d) The notice of motion for blood tests pursuant to this section shall be
supported by a declaration under oath submitted by the moving party stating
the factual basis for placing the issue of paternity before the court.
(e) Subdivision (a) does not apply, and blood tests may not be used to
challenge paternity, in any of the following cases:
(1) A case which reached final judgment of paternity on or before
September 30, 1980.
(2) A case coming within Section 7613.
(3) A case in which the wife, with the consent of the husband, conceived
by means of a surgical procedure.

Id.
47. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-107(1) (1990); WyO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2104(a) (Michie 1997); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 302-03 (1987), the
full text of which is provided infra note 70.
48. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
49. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (West Supp. 1989) (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 3100 (1994)).
50. Id. The exact text of the statute is as follows:
[T]he court shall grant reasonable visitation rights to a parent unless it is
shown that the visitation would be detrimental to the best interest ofthe child.
In the discretion of the court, reasonable visitation rights may be granted to
any other person having an interest in the welfare of the child.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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showed a 98.07% probability that he was the father of the child in question.5
He alleged that he was denied the privileges of a parent under the custody
statute, however, because of California's
conclusive presumption of paternity in
52
the husband of the child's mother.
The Supreme Court upheld the California statute, but the scope of the
decision is open to question because the justices were sharply divided on the key
issue of whether an unwed father has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in establishing his parental relationship with the child. The plurality opinion,
authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, held that the putative father had not met his burden of
establishing that the state had infringed upon a "fundamental" right "traditionally
protected by our society. '53 The four dissenting justices-Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and White--disagreed, arguing that the Court's unwed fathers cases
established the basic principle that "an unwed father who has demonstrated a
sufficient commitment to his paternity by way of personal, financial, or custodial
responsibilities has a protected liberty interest in a relationship with his child."'54
Justice Stevens cast the deciding vote but sidestepped the critical issue. He
simply assumed, for purposes of the case, that the putative father had a
constitutional right to establish a relationship with the child." He ultimately
concluded that the state did not infringe upon that right because the statute
allowed Michael H. to seek visitation rights as a "person having an interest in the
welfare of the childf-" even though he was denied the status of a "parent."56
In addition to assuring equal protection for unwed fathers, the Supreme
Court has altered traditional common law by denouncing the discriminatory
treatment of illegitimate children. In a series of cases during the late 1960s and
early 1970s, the Court held that illegitimate children have the same right to
support, wrongful death actions, and other benefits for which legitimate children
are eligible.57 As a result, states have modified their parentage statutes to

51. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 110.
52. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1989) (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7540 (West 1994)).
53. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121-27 (1989). "[T]o the contrary,

our traditions have protected the marital family... against the sort of claim [the
putative father] asserts." Id. at 124.
54. Id. at 142, 157-58.
55. Id. at 133.
56. Id.

57. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (holding that "once a State
posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their
natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an
essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not married its mother");
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (holding that illegitimate children
may not be excluded from sharing equally with other children in the recovery of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
workmen's
compensation benefits for the death of their parent); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
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eliminate the prior bias against illegitimate children. Although it is difficult to
identify the precise status of the law across the United States today, a review of
the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 (UPA),58 which has been adopted by
eighteen states,59 provides a general flavor of how the Supreme Court's
constitutional doctrine has been coordinated with the traditional common law.
The Act begins by defining the "parent and child relationship" as the "legal
relationship existing between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident
to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations."'
In deference to the Supreme Court's equal protection decisions, the Act's second
section declares that "[the parent and child relationship extends equally to every
child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents."6 The
remainder of the Act addresses the "sine qua non of equal legal rights-the
identification of the person against whom these rights may be asserted."62
With respect to maternity, the Act provides that the child's natural mother
"may be established by proof of her having given birth to the child, or under this
Act ... ."63 This definition generally codifies the common law practice of
determining maternity by proof of gestation but also allows maternity to be
established by other means, as explained by Section 21 of the Act: "Any

U.S. 68 (1968) (holding that illegitimate children may not be excluded from the benefit
of a state-created right of action for the wrongful death of a parent). The rationale behind
this change in the law was that:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's
condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But
visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.
Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship
to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is
responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an
ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of deterring the parent. Courts are
powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered by these hapless children,
but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory
laws relating to status of birth where-as in this case-the classification is
justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise.
Weber, 406 U.S. at 175-76 (footnotes omitted).
58. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, 9B U.L.A. 296 (1987).
59. Jurisdictions adopting the UPA hiclude Alabama, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. 9B
U.L.A. 287 (1987 & Supp. 1998).
60. Id. § 1, 9B U.L.A. 296 (1987).
61. Id. § 2, 9B U.L.A. 296 (1987).
62. Id. prefatory note, 9B U.L.A. 289 (1987).
63. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 297-98 (1987). In cases of adoption, the
Act provides that the child's relationship with an adoptive parent may be established by
proof of
or under
the Revised
Uniform
Act.Repository,
Id.
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interested party may bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence
of a mother and child relationship. Insofar as practicable, the provisions of this
Act applicable to the father and child relationship apply."'
Determining paternity requires reference to several provisions of the Act,
which, as one court described it, is much like "trying to obtain a permit from a
bureaucracy and continually being referred to another department .....65
Section 4 of the Act sets forth five statutory presumptions regarding paternity.6
The first three are related to the common law marital presumption that a child
born to a married woman is presumed to be the child of the woman's husband. 67

64. Id. § 21, 9B U.L.A. 334 (1987). The comment to § 21 states:
This Section permits the declaration of the mother and child
relationship where that is in dispute. Since it is not believed that
cases of this nature will arise frequently, Sections 4 to 20 are
written principally in terms of the ascertainment of paternity.
While it is obvious that certain provisions in these Sections would
not apply in an action to establish the mother and child
relationship, the Committee decided not to burden these-already
complex-provisions with references to the ascertainment of
maternity. In any given case, a judge facing a claim for the
determination of the mother and child relationship should have
little difficulty deciding which portions of Sections 4 to 20 should
be applied.
Id. § 21 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 334 (1987)
65. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), affd sub
nom Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993).
66. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 4, 9B U.L.A. 298 (1987).
67. Id. § 4(a)(1)-(3), 9B U.L.A. 298-99 (1987). The full text of this Section is as
follows:
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:
(1) he and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each
other and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days after the
marriage is terminated by death; annulment, declaration of invalidity, or
divorce, or after a decree of separation is entered by a court;
(2) before the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have
attempted to marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent
compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared
invalid, and,
(i) if the attempted marriage could be declared invalid only
by a court, the child is born during the attempted marriage, or
within 300 days after its termination by death, annulment,
declaration of invalidity, or divorce; or
(ii) if the attempted marriage is invalid without a court order,
the child is born within 300 days after the termination of
cohabitation;
(3) after the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have
married, or attempted to marry, each other by a marriage solemnized in
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
apparent compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be
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The final two presumptions recognize a man as the natural father if he receives
a minor child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child
or if he acknowledges his paternity in a writing filed with the appropriate
authority.

68

Although some states hold the marital presumption irrefutable, as
mentioned above,69 the UPA allows the marital presumption to be rebutted in an
action by the child, the mother, or the presumed father, but only within five years
of the child's birth.70 Any other man alleging he is the biological father may not
bring an action of his own to challenge the marital presumption, but may be

declared invalid, and
(i) he has acknowledged his paternity of the child in
writing filed with the [appropriate court or Vital
Statistics Bureau].
(ii) with his consent, he is named as the child's father
on the child's birth certificate, or
(iii) he is obligated to support the child under a written
voluntary promise or by court order;
(4) while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into
his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child; or
(5) he acknowledges his paternity of the child in a writing filed with the
[appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau], which shall promptly infonn the
mother of the filing of the acknowledgment, and she does not dispute the
acknowledgment within a reasonable time after being informed thereof, in a
writing filed with the [appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau]. If another
man is presumed under this section to be the child's father, acknowledgment
may be effected only with the written consent of the presumed father or after
the presumption has been rebutted.
Id.
68. Id. § 4(a)(4)-(5), 9B U.L.A. 299 (1987); see supra note 68 for full text of § 4.
69. See supra note 46.
70. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 6(a)(2), 9B U.L.A. 302 (1987). The Act states, in
pertinent part:
(a) A child, his natural mother, or a man presumed to be his father under
Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of Section 4(a), may bring an action
(1) at any time for the purpose of declaring the existence of the father
and child relationship presumed under Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of Section
4(a); or
(2) for the purpose of declaring the non-existence of the father and child
relationship presumed under Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of Section 4(a) only if
the action is brought within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of
relevant facts, but in no event later than [five] years after the child's birth.
After the presumption has been rebutted, paternity of the child by another
man may be determined in the same action, if he has been made a party.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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declared the father if the marital presumption is rebutted in an action brought by
the child, the mother, or the presumed father.7'
The Act requires clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumptions
and provides that if the presumptions lead to conflicting results in a particular
case, "the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier
considerations of policy and logic controls." 72 Section 12 sets forth the types of
evidence that may be considered, including:
(1) evidence of sexual intercourse between the mother and alleged
father at any possible time of conception;
(2) an expert's opinion concerning the statistical probability of the
alleged father's paternity based upon the duration of the mother's
pregnancy;
(3) blood test results, weighted in accordance with evidence, if
available, of the statistical probability of the alleged father's paternity;
(4) medical or anthropological evidence relating to the alleged father's
paternity of the child based on tests performed by experts. If a man
has been identified as a possible father of the child, the court may, and
upon request of a party shall, require the child, the mother, and the
man to submit to appropriate tests; and
(5) all other evidence relevant to the issue of paternity of the child."
The UPA does not mention DNA tests because it was promulgated before
such tests came into existence. A number of states have subsequently modified
their acts, however, to allow for genetic testing in addition to or instead of blood
testing.74
71. Id. If the case falls under one of the final two presumptions, an action may be
brought by "[a]ny interested party." Id. § 6(b), 9B U.L.A. 302 (1987). If none of the

presumptions applies, an action to determine paternity may be brought:
[B]y the child, the mother or personal representative of the child, the
[appropriate state agency], the personal representative or a parent of the
mother if the mother has died, a man alleged or alleging himself to be the

father, or the personal representative or a parent of the alleged father if the
alleged father has died or is a minor.
Id. § 6(c), 9B U.L.A. 302 (1987).

72. Id. § 4(b), 9B U.L.A. 299 (1987). Section 4(b) provides that:
A presumption under this section may be rebutted in an appropriate action
only by clear and convincing evidence. If two or more presumptions arise

which conflict with each other, the presumption which on the facts is founded
on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls. The presumption
is rebutted by a court decree establishing paternity of the child by another

man.
Id. § 4(b), 9B U.L.A. 299 (1987).
73. Id. § 12, 9B U.L.A. 317 (1987).
74. Id. § 12 note on Variations from Official Text, 9B U.L.A. 319 (Supp. 1998);
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
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In summary, the thrust of modem parentage statutes-like the traditional
common law-turns in large part on search for the biological parent. The
preference for biology is tempered by social policy, however, as illustrated by
the presumption of paternity in the husband of a married woman who gives birth.
The following section looks at these concepts as they relate to parentage
questions raised by new reproductive technology.
I. THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
Medical science has made tremendous advances during the past several
decades,7 providing several ways of assisting reproduction by persons incapable
of conceiving through natural means. Two methods in particular-artificial
insemination 76 and in vitro fertilization 7 7-have allowed the proliferation of
voluntary surrogacy arrangements in which an infertile couple contracts with a
surrogate mother to produce a child for the intended parents. Although many of
these surrogacy arrangements have been carried out without conflict, some have
resulted in highly publicized disputes between the surrogate and the intended

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/11 (1996). North Dakota further provides procedural rules for
verifying the chain of custody of the genetic specimens and admissibility of the verified
report from a court-appointed examiner. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 12 note on Variations
from Official Text, 9B U.L.A. 319 (Supp. 1998).
75. Twenty years have elapsed since Louise Brown was introduced to the world
in July 1978 as the first child born through the use of in vitro fertilization. First TestTube Baby 20 Years Old, AP, July 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6698457. Artificial
insemination was available prior to that time, but it was Brown's birth that thrust the new
reproductive technology into the public consciousness.
76. Artificial insemination is one of the oldest and simplest forms of infertility
treatment. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INFERTILITYMEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 126 (1988). In essence, the physician replicates the
results of sexual intercourse by using a syringe or catheter to place sperm into the
woman's cervical canal or uterus at a time when the woman is ovulating. Id.
77. In vitro fertilization is a more sophisticated fertility treatment in which eggs are
collected from a woman-either through surgical procedures such as laparoscopy or
nonsurgical retrieval guided by ultrasound-and fertilized with sperm in a culture dish.
Id. at 123. After the fertilized eggs begin to cleave, they may be implanted within a
woman's uterine cavity at the two-to sixteen-cell stage. Id. Another option is to freeze
the embryos, using glycerol or another similar substance to protect the embryos from
damage in the freezing process. Id. at 127-28.
In a more complicated variation on this process, called gamete intrafallopian
transfer (GIFT), sperm and eggs are transferred directly into the woman's fallopian tubes
via laparoscopy to allow fertilization to take place there. Id. at 123-24. A more recent
variation is the zygote intrafallopian transfer, in which a fertilized egg is placed into the
fallopian tubes after in vitro fertilization. G.W. Patton, et al., TransvaginalEmbryo
Transfer During the Zygote Intrafallopian Tube Transfer Procedure, 171 AM. J. OF
OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY
359 (1994).
Published by University
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parents. The following discussion looks at how the law has resolved these
disputes, beginning with cases and statutory law concerning artificial
insemination, followed by the legal response to in vitro fertilization.
A. Conception Through ArtificialInsemination
Artificial insemination has been available since the 1800s, 78 but was not
widely used in the United States until the early 1940s. 79 In most cases, the
treatment is used to allow a woman to bear her own child with the use of sperm
from her husband or a donor, but the procedure also has been used in surrogacy
arrangements in which a woman agrees to bear a child for another couple. The
laws governing each scenario are discussed below.
1. The Use of Artificial Insemination by an Infertile Couple Using
Donor Semen
Traditional parentage laws can be applied without complication when an
infertile couple attempts to bear a child by having the wife artificially
inseminated with the husband's sperm. Because the wife is the woman who
gives birth, she automatically is considered the child's natural mother. The
husband is presumed to be the father because of his marriage to the mother, but
he also could establish paternity through genetic testing, if required, because he
is the biological father as well.
When the couple uses donated sperm, on the other hand, application of
traditional parentage laws could lead to anomalous results because it is the sperm
donor, rather than the husband, who has a biological connection to the child. To
prevent this unintended event, many states have enacted laws governing parental
rights when artificial inseniination is used in this manner. Illustrative is a section
of the UPA, which provides that the mother's husband would be recognized as

78.

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,

INFERTILITY

-

MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 126 (1988). Dr. John Hunter, a Scottish surgeon,

performed the first recorded use of artificial insemination on a human in 1799. Brent J.
Jensen, Comment, ArtificialInsemination and the Law, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 935, 938.
Dr. J. Marion Sims replicated the procedure in the United States in 1866. Id.
79. Jensen, supranote 78, at 938. "It has been estimated that in the United States
10,000 children were conceived by artificial insemination before 1941 and that 1,000 to
1,200 children were conceived by artificial insemination each year between 1941 and
1963." Id. That number increased to more than 65,000 children born in 1987 alone.
Eric Lichtblau, ArtificialInsemination DataRaises Fears,L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1988,
at 14, available in 1998 WL 2225082 (citing Office of Technology Assessment study
that found more than 172,000 women resorted to artificial insemination to become
pregnant in 1987, resulting in 65,000 births).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
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the natural father so long as he has given his written consent to the procedure.8"
A male who donates sperm for artificial insemination is not the father. 8'
This provision-the UPA's only attempt to address the ramifications of new
reproductive technology 82-marks a subtle, but significant, departure from the
biological premise that drives the Act's other substantive provisions. One could
argue that the rule merely revives the social policies underlying the traditional
presumption that a child born to a married woman is the offspring of the
woman's husband.83 It is significant, however, that the provision is not an
automatic presumption; rather, the husband must consent before being declared
the natural father.
From a broader perspective, therefore, one could argue this provision links
parental status with the parties' intentions or expectations of parenthood.' It

80. The full text of the provision is as follows:
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent
of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a
man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural
father of a child thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in writing
and signed by him and his wife. The physician shall certify their signatures
and the date of the insemination, and file the husband's consent with the
[State Department of Health], where it shall be kept confidential and in a
sealed file. However, the physician's failure to do so does not affect the
father and child relationship. All papers and records pertaining to the
insemination, whether part of the permanent record of a court or of a file held
by the supervising physician or elsewhere, are subject to inspection only upon
an order of the court for good cause shown.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987).
81. Id. ("The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he
were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived."). If applied in the Baby M case,
this provision arguably could have precluded William Stem's claim to the child. The
New Jersey legislature, however, had slightly modified subparagraph (b) to provide:
[ulnless the donor of semen and the woman have entered into a written
contractto the contrary, the donor of semen provided to a licensed physician
for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is
treated in law as if he were not the father of a child thereby conceived and
shall have no rights or duties stemming from the conception of a child.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:17-44 (West 1983) (emphasis added). William Stem's surrogacy
contract with Mary Beth Whitehead would appear to meet the requirements of this
statute, but other parts of the contract pertaining to Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights were
held invalid as a matter of public policy.
82. The drafters made it clear, however, that while they thought it useful to address
this particular fact situation, they did not intend to deal with the full range of "complex
and serious legal problems raised by the practice of artificial insemination." UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 5 comment, 9B U.L.A. 301-02 (1987).
83. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 286 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
84. See
Published
by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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recognizes that a sperm donor does not intend to become a father while,
conversely, a husband who consents to artificial insemination of his wife with
another man's sperm does expect to take on the rights and responsibilities of a
parent even though he is not the biological father.
2. The Use of Artificial Insemination in Surrogacy Arrangements
The practice of artificial insemination is more controversial when used to
impregnate a surrogate mother who intends to bear the child for another couple.
Surrogacy arrangements were first placed under the public microscope in the
case of Baby M,85 which arose when William and Elizabeth Stem, unable to have
their own children, arranged for surrogate Mary Beth Whitehead to produce a
child through artificial insemination using Mr. Stem's sperm.86 Although Mrs.
Whitehead initially agreed to deliver the child to the Stems and to take the
necessary steps to terminate her parental rights so that Mrs. Stem could adopt the
child, she ultimately reneged on the agreement and claimed the child as her
87
own.

When Mr. Stem brought an action to enforce the surrogacy contract, s8 the
New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated the contract on public policy grounds and
relied instead upon traditional parentage law to resolve the custody dispute.89
The court held that payment of money to a surrogate was "illegal... perhaps
criminal," and potentially degrading to women and that the termination of Mrs.
(noting that the artificial insemination provision indicates a legislative intent to recognize
parentage "where a person who caused a child to come into being had no biological
relationship to the child").

85. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
86. Id. at 1235.
87. Id. at 1235-37.
88. Mrs. Stem was not a party to the contract, presumably to avoid the application
of New Jersey's statute prohibiting "baby-selling." Id. at 1235 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3-54, which provides that any person who pays or accepts money in connection with
any placement of a child for adoption is guilty of a misdemeanor).
89. Id. at 1234.
90. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d. 1227, 1240, 1250 (N.J. 1988) (rejecting Mr. Stem's
claim that the payments made to Mrs. Whitehead were for her services-giving a child
to Mr. Stem-rather than a fee for an adoption). In discussing the public policy
underpinning the baby-selling statute, the court observed:
The evils inherent in baby-bartering are loathsome for a myriad of reasons.
The child is sold without regard for whether the purchasers will be suitable
parents.... The natural mother does not receive the benefit of counseling and
guidance to assist her in making a decision that may affect her for a lifetime.
In fact, the monetary incentive to sell her child may, depending on her
financial circumstances, make her decision less voluntary.... Furthermore,
the adoptive parents may not be fully informed of the natural parents' medical
history.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
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Whitehead's parental rights by contract was contrary to state laws providing for
termination only when (1) there has been a voluntary surrender of a child to an
approved agency accompanied by a formal document acknowledging
termination of parental rights; or (2) there has been a showing of parental
abandonment or unfitness. 9'
Because neither of these requirements had been met, the court concluded
that Mrs. Whitehead retained her parental rights as the natural mother.92 To
determine custody between Mrs. Whitehead and the natural father, Mr. Stem, the
court applied the usual "best interests of the child" test, ultimately holding that
the Stems would provide the most secure and stable environment. 93 Mrs.
Whitehead was granted visitation rights.94
In short, the Baby M case was decided under the traditional regime

awarding parental status on the basis of the biological connection. Because the
arrangement involved artificial insemination, Mrs. Whitehead performed all of
the usual biological functions of a mother by providing the egg that was
fertilized by William Stem's sperm and by carrying the fetus to term. Thus,
there was no question about the identity of the biological mother. The paternity

Baby-selling potentially results in the exploitation of all parties
involved.... Conversely, adoption statutes seek to further humanitarian
goals, foremost among them the best interests of the child.... The negative
consequences of baby-buying are potentially present in the surrogacy context,
especially the potential for placing and adopting a child without regard to the
interest of the child or the natural mother.
Id. at 1241-42 (citations and footnote omitted).
91. Id. at 1242-44 ("[I]t is clear that a contractual agreement to abandon one's
parental rights, or not to contest a termination action, will not be enforced in our courts.
The Legislature would not have so carefully, so consistently, and so substantially
restricted termination of parental rights if it had intended to allow termination to be
achieved by one short sentence in a contract."). The court also criticized the
irrevocability of Mrs. Whitehead's surrender of her parental rights without meeting the
statutory prerequisites for voluntary surrenders. The court stated:
These strict prerequisites to irrevocability constitute a recognition of the most
serious consequences that flow from such consents: termination of parental
rights, the permanent separation of parent from child, and the ultimate
adoption of the child ....
Because of those consequences, the Legislature
severely limited the circumstances under which such consent would be
irrevocable. The legislative goal is furthered by regulations requiring
approved agencies, prior to accepting irrevocable consents, to provide advice
and counseling to women, making it more likely that they fully understand
and appreciate the consequences of their acts.
Id. at 1245.
92. Id. at 1252-53.
93. Id. at 1260-61.
94. Id. at 1263; see also In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that surrogate, who was both the genetic and gestational mother
of a childbyproduced
through
artificialSchool
insemination,
the child'sRepository,
natural mother).
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determination similarly followed the biological connection by identifying Mr.
Stem, the sperm provider, as the father.
Other courts confronted with parentage claims in surrogacy cases involving
artificial insemination have uniformly followed Baby M in refusing to enforce
surrogacy agreements on the grounds that such agreements violate other state
laws or public policy." State legislatures, on the other hand, have taken two
divergent approaches. Because most of these statutes address surrogacies arising
through the use of in vitro fertilization as well as artificial insemination, they are
discussed in greater detail in the following section.96 To the extent that some of
these statutes refer only to artificial insemination, it is significant to note for
purposes of this part of the analysis that some of the states have enacted laws
making surrogacy agreements void.97 Others, however, have upheld such
agreements.98

95. See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998) (holding surrogacy
agreement unenforceable because it violated statutory prohibition against compensation
in connection with adoption and conflicted with adoption statute holding mother's
consent unenforceable unless made more than four days after child's birth); In re
Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990) (holding surrogacy agreement
void and declaring surrogate mother to be child's natural mother because surrogacy
agreement violated statutory prohibition against acceptance of compensation in
connection with an adoption); cf Doe v. Kelly, 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding in a declaratory judgment action that state's baby-selling statute did not
unconstitutionally infringe couple's right to procreate through surrogacy arrangement
because couple could still procreate through this means; statute merely prohibited
payment to surrogate). For further discussion of the conflict between surrogacy
arrangements and public policy, see infra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
Other courts, however, have found such agreements merely voidable, which
allowed them to be upheld unless surrogate objected and claimed parental rights for
herself. See, e.g., Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209
(Ky. 1986) (finding that surrogacy arrangement did not implicate concerns underlying
baby-selling statute, but surrogate's promise to surrender custody and terminate parental
rights was voidable under state's termination of parental rights statute), modified by
statute,KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (Michie 1995) (holding surrogacy agreements
void if surrogate is to be compensated).
96. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (Michie 1995) (declaring
surrogacy contracts void if they provide compensation to surrogate for her artificial
insemination and subsequent termination of parental rights); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:2713 (West 1991) (declaring as void any contract for surrogate motherhood, which is
defined as "any agreement whereby a person not married to the contributor of the sperm
agrees for valuable consideration to be inseminated, to carry any resulting fetus to birth,
and then to relinquish to the contributor of the sperm the custody and all rights and
obligations to the child").
98. Arkansas, for example, enacted a statute which provides that if a child is born

to a surrogate from the use of artificial insemination, the child's legal parent(s) shall be

the biological father and/or the woman who was intended to be the mother. ARK. CODE
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1

22

Noble-Allgire: Noble-Allgire: Switched at the Fertility Clinic:

19991

REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY

In sum, the legal community is divided. While some states have rejected
surrogacy arrangements and continue to adhere to the traditional rules linking
biology and parentage, others have begun to recognize that new technology
allows one to become a parent as a matter of choice and intentions rather than
simply by nature and, to the extent those intentions are represented in a
surrogacy agreement, they should be respected. This conflict between biology
and intent is developed further in the following section.
B. In Vitro Fertilization-TheEmergence of Non-Genetic Surrogate
Mothers
Although in vitro fertilization typically is used to assist couples in
producing their own biological children, the process also has fostered surrogacy
arrangements because it bifurcates the biological functions of motherhood. In
other words, it allows one woman to produce the ova for in vitro fertilization
while another gestates the fertilized egg(s) and ultimately gives birth.99 As
alluded to above, a number of states enacted statutes addressing the validity of
surrogacy agreements and, in some instances, spelling out parental rights when
such agreements are void. Legislatures in other states, however, have left the
parentage issue for the courts to decide under the state's existing parentage laws.
This section begins by examining some of the modem statutes, followed by a
review of the case law that has struggled to apply traditional parentage laws in
the context of voluntary surrogacies.
1. Parentage Determinations Under Surrogacy Statutes
State legislatures have reacted to surrogacy arrangements in a variety of
ways. Statutes vary not only with respect to the validity of such arrangements
in general, but also about the default rules that should be applied to determine
parentage when such agreements are void or not validly executed.

ANN. § 9-10-201(b), (c) (Michie 1993). More specifically, it states that:

[I]n the case of a surrogate mother,... the child shall be that of: (A) The
biological father and the woman intended to be the mother if the biological

father is married; or (B) The biological father only if unmarried; or (C) The
woman intended to be the mother in cases of a surrogate mother when an
anonymous donor's sperm was utilized for artificial insemination.
Id.
99. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994) ("By successfully
implanting an embryo into the uterus of a female who has become known as the
'gestational surrogate,' . . . modem medicine has devised a way of separating birth from
genetics.").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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a. Validity of surrogacy statutes
Surrogacy statutes enacted during the last two decades fall across a wide
spectrum. Some states have explicitly authorized the use of unpaid surrogacy
agreements,'1 ° but only under strictly limited circumstances.' 0 ' Other states have
enacted statutes declaring all surrogacy agreements void and unenforceable,
regardless of whether the surrogate receives compensation. 0 2 In the middle are
statutes invalidating agreements in which the surrogate is compensated but silent

100. See FLA. STAT. ch. 742.15 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.045 (1995); N.H.
§ 168-B:16 (1994 & Supp.1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-159, 20160(B)(4) (Michie 1995).
101. Florida, New Hampshire, and Virginia permit surrogacies only if the intended
mother is infertile or otherwise medically incapable of carrying a child to term and at
least one of the intending parents must provide an egg or sperm. FLA. STAT. ch.
742.15(2), 742.16(6) (1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17 (1994 & Supp.1996);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20- 160(B)(8), (9) (Michie 1995); see also UNIF. STATUS OF
CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 1(3) Alternative A comment, 9B U.L.A. 187
(Supp. 1998); id. § 6(b)(2) Alternative A, 9B U.L.A. 188 (Supp. 1998). Nevada would
require that the egg and sperm of both intending parents be used. NEV. REV. STAT. §
126.045(4)(a) (1995).
All of the statutes authorizing surrogacy contracts require the intending parents to
be legally married. FLA. STAT. ch. 742.15(1) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.045(4)(b)
(1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:l(VII) (1994 & Supp.1996); VA. CODE ANN. §
20- 156 (Michie 1995); see also UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION
ACT § 1(3), 9B U.L.A. 187 (Supp. 1998). They also impose eligibility requirements on
surrogates, requiring them to be a minimum age, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 742.15(1)
(1995) (18 or older), and in some cases, requiring a documented history of at least one
prior pregnancy and viable delivery. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17(V)
(1994 & Supp.1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 20- 160(6) (Michie 1995); UNIF. STATUS OF
CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT Alternative A § 6(b)(6), 9B U.L.A. 191-92
(Supp. 1998).
New Hampshire and Virginia require judicial approval of the surrogacy agreement
prior to conception. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16(I)(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996); VA.
REV. STAT. ANN.

CODE ANN. §§ 20- 160 (Michie 1995); see also UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED

CONCEPTION ACT § 5(b) Alternative A, 9B U.L.A. 190-91 (Supp. 1998); Florida courts,
however, conduct an expedited review after the child's birth. FLA. STAT. ch. 742.16

(1995).
To obtain this judicial approval, the contracts must contain certain mandatory terms;
the parties may also be required to comply with other conditions which are "roughly
analogous to adoption procedures currently in place in mostjurisdictions." UNIF. STATUS
OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION AT § 6 Alternative A comment, 9B U.L.A. 192
(Supp. 1998); see FLA. STAT. ch. 742.15 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B: 16-B:25
(1994 & Supp.1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-160 (Michie 1995).
102. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(A) (West 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16402(a) (1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-20-1-1, 31-20-1-2 (Michie 1997); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West 1993); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney Supp.
1997);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1995).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
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as to unpaid arrangements, °3 which suggests that the latter are implicitly
authorized or, at the very least, voidable but not necessarily void.
The drafters of the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
("USCACA") recognized the intense debate over enforceability of surrogacy
agreements and ultimately decided to give state lawmakers a choice between two
altematives.' 4 Under one of these alternatives, private surrogacy agreements are
not recognized at all.' 5 Under the other alternative, they are recognized and
enforceable, but only in strictly limited circumstances." °
b. Determining parentage in the absence of a valid surrogacy agreement
In states where surrogacy arrangements are legal, parental status obviously
is determined by the terms of the agreement itself, assuming that the agreement
fulfills all of the statutory requirements. If the agreement fails to satisfy these
requirements, however, the statutes typically provide a default rule for
determining parentage. Default rules also have been enacted in states refusing
to recognize surrogacy agreements at all.
Many of these statutes express a preference for the gestational mother.
North Dakota, for example, follows Alternative B of the USCACA, which
provides that all surrogate agreements are void and that the surrogate is the
child's mother.'0 7 Paternity depends, however, upon whether the surrogate is

married and whether her husband was a party to the surrogacy agreement. 0 8 A
handful of other statutes similarly express a preference for the gestational mother
but provide varying rules governing paternity. ' Other states, however, would

103. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (Michie 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE §§
26.26.230, 26.26.240 (1996). Other states have not explicitly authorized surrogacy

§ 9:2713 (West 1991);

agreements, but have exempted them from state laws prohibiting payments in connection

with adoptions. See ALA. CODE §26-10A-34 (1992); IOWA CODE § 710.11 (1997); W.
VA. CODE § 48-4-16(e)(3) (1996).
104. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION AcT, 9B U.L.A. 184-86
(Supp. 1998).
105. Id. Alternative B § 5, 9B U.L.A. 197 (Supp. 1998).

106. Id. Alternative A § 5, 9B U.L.A. 190 (Supp. 1998).
107. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1997).
108. Id. (providing that surrogate's husband is the father if he is a party to the

surrogacy agreement, but "[i]f the surrogate's husband is not a party to the agreement or
the surrogate is unmarried, paternity of the child is governed by chapter 14-17 [the state's
adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act]").

109. For default rules in states that refuse to recognize surrogacy contracts, see
ARiz.REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(B), (C) (West 1991) (providing that the surrogate is the
legal mother of a child born as a result of a surrogate contract and, if married, "her
husband is presumed to be the legal father of the child. This presumption is rebuttable.");
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1995) (stating that "[tlhe biological father of a child born
pursuant to such a contract shall have all the rights and obligations imposed by law with
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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award parentage under a best interests test, as used in typical child custody
disputes between divorcing or unwed parents." 0
Virginia has a more complicated regime that adopted parts of Alternative
A under the USCACA but substantially modified other parts of the uniform law.
The Virginia statute provides that surrogacy contracts may be enforced even
without prior court approval, but only if the surrogate voluntarily relinquishes
her parental rights to the intended parents-at least one of whom is the genetic
parent of the child."' If the surrogate does not voluntarily relinquish her rights,
parentage is determined by the following formula:
1. The gestational mother is the child's mother unless the intended
mother is a genetic parent, in which case the intended mother is the
mother.
2. If either of the intended parents is a genetic parent of the resulting
child, the intended father is the child's father. However, if (i) the
surrogate is married, (ii) her husband is a party to the surrogacy
contract, and (iii) the surrogate exercises her right to retain custody
and parental rights to the resulting child pursuant to § 20-162, then the
surrogate and her husband are the parents.
3. If neither of the intended parents is a genetic parent of the resulting
child, the surrogate is the mother and her husband is the child's father
if he is a party to the contract. The intended parents may only obtain
12
parental rights through adoption ....

respect to such child"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(3)(a) (1995) (providing that "the
surrogate mother is the mother of the child for all legal purposes, and her husband, if she
is married, is the father of the child for all legal purposes").
For states that generally recognize surrogacy agreements, but provide default rules
in the absence of such agreements, see FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.11(2), 742.15(3)(e) (West
1997) (providing that in the absence of an approved surrogacy arrangement, the
gestational mother and her husband are the parents); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:2
(1994 & Supp. 1996) (providing that in the absence of an approved surrogacy agreement,
the gestational mother is the legal mother and her husband is the presumed father).
110. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 722.861 (West 1993) (providing that if
there is a dispute over a child born under surrogacy agreement, "[t]he circuit court shall

award legal custody of the child based on a determination of the best interests of the
child" as defined in the state's child custody act); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.260 (1996)
(providing that "the superior court shall award legal custody of the child based upon the

factors listed" in the state's child custody act).
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-162 (Michie 1995); see also id. § 20-158(E)(4) ("After
the signing and filing of the surrogate consent and report form in conformance with the
requirements of subsection A of § 20-162, the intended parents are the parents of the

child and the surrogate and her husband, if any, shall not be the parents of the child.").
112. Id. § 20-158(E).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
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The USCACA, on the other hand, would always award parentage to the
gestational mother, but declare the surrogate's husband the legal father only if
he was a party to the agreement." 3 If the surrogate is unmarried or her husband
was not a party to the agreement, patemity is determined under the UPA. As a
result, the genetic father would prevail if the surrogate is unmarried but the
surrogate's husband otherwise would be the child's presumed father. 4 Where

donor sperm or eggs are used, the USCACA would follow the artificial
insemination provisions of the UPA n5 and other sperm/egg
donor statutes116 in
7
parent.'
child's
the
not
is
donor
the
that
providing

113.

UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 5 Alternative

A,

9B U.L.A. 190 (Supp. 1998). The full text of this provision is as follows:
(a) A surrogate, her husband, if she is married, and intended parents
may enter into a written agreement whereby the surrogate relinquishes all her
rights and duties as a parent of a child to be conceived through assisted
conception, and the intended parents may become the parents of the child
pursuant to Section 8.
(b) If the agreement is not approved by the court under Section 6 before
conception, the agreement is void and the surrogate is the mother of a
resulting child and the surrogate's husband, if a party to the agreement, is the
father of the child. If the surrogate's husband is not a party to the agreement
or the surrogate is unmarried, paternity of the child is governed by [the
Uniform Parentage Act].
Id. at 190-91.
114. Id.
115. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987).
116. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-775 (1993) ("A donor of sperm used in
A.I.D. [artificial insemination using donor sperm], or any person claiming by or through
him, shall not have any right or interest in any child born as a result of A.I.D."); OK.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 555 (West 1998) ("An oocyte donor shall have no right, obligation
or interest with respect to a child born as a result of heterologous oocyte donation from
such donor.").
117. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4, 9B U.L.A. 189
(Supp. 1998). The Virginia statute and the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act ("USCACA") also provide for parentage in the event the agreement is
terminated after conception by a surrogate who has provided the egg for the assisted
conception. Id. Alternative A § 7(b), 9B U.L.A. 194 (Supp. 1998) ("A surrogate who
has provided an egg for the assisted conception pursuant to an agreement approved under
Section 6 may terminate the agreement by filing written notice with the court within 180
days after the last insemination pursuant to the agreement."); VA. CODE ANN. § 20161 (B) (Michie 1995) (providing that surrogate who is also genetic parent may terminate
agreement within 180 days of last performance of assisted conception). If the surrogate
exercises this option, she will be deemed the mother of the child. UNIF. STATUS OF
CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 8(a)(2) Altemative A, 9B U.L.A. 195-96
(Supp. 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(D) (Michie 1995).
Under the Virginia statute, the husband of the surrogate will be the father. VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-158(D) (Michie 1995). The USCACA provides, however, that the
surrogate's husband will be the father only if he is a party to the surrogacy agreement;
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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2. Case Law Applying Traditional Parentage Laws
In the absence of legislation that specifically addresses parentage in the
context of surrogacy arrangements, courts must attempt to resolve such disputes
through traditional parentage laws. Because these laws focus on the identity of
the biological parent(s), however, they are difficult to apply to disputes involving
children born through surrogacy arrangements using in vitro fertilization because
two women have divided the biological functions of motherhood. Thus, courts
must decide which of the two is the child's "natural" mother.
One response might be "both," but the handful of courts that have addressed
this issue in voluntary surrogacy cases have unanimously rejected the concept
of dual maternity." 8 In interpreting their own state's law, which, in all of the
reported decisions, was adopted from the UPA, courts have acknowledged that
the plain language of the statute suggests that both women can establish

maternity. The relevant provision of the UPA provides that the relationship
between the child and the natural mother "may be established by proof of her
having given birth to the child, or under this Act."" 9 The gestational mother
obviously qualifies under the first clause while the genetic mother qualifies
under the phrase "under this Act" because she can prove maternity through

if the husband is not a party to the agreement or if the surrogate is unmarried, paternity
is governed by the UPA. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT §
8(a)(2) Alternative A, 9B U.L.A. 196 (Supp. 1998). As a practical matter, this means that
the intending father will be deemed the legal father because, as the USCACA drafting
committee points out, a surrogate can terminate the agreement after conception only if

she provides the egg. See id. § 7(b) Alternative A, 9B U.L.A. 194 (Supp. 1998); id. § 8
Alternative A comment, 9B U.L.A. 196 (Supp. 1998). This means that the intending
father must have provided the sperm because § 1(3) of the Act requires at least one
intended parent to provide genetic material. See id. § 1(3), 9B U.L.A. 187 (Supp. 1998).
The intended father, therefore, can establish paternity under the Uniform Parentage Act
through this genetic connection. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 12(3), 9B U.L.A. 317 (1987).
The committee recognized that having the legally recognized father and legally
recognized mother in different households was "regrettable... and may precipitate
litigation over custody...." UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT
§ 8 Alternative A comment, 9B U.L.A. 196 (Supp. 1998). But the committee noted that
the situation is not entirely unique in family law. Id.

118. See id. at 763; Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal.), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 874 (1993); see also McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994) (the court does not expressly address the issue, but by following Johnson, the court
implicitly suggests that the Act contemplates only one mother).
119. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 3(1), 9B U.L.A. 297-98 (1987).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
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blood or genetic testing. 20 Nonetheless, the courts have2 held that "society and
the law recognize only one natural mother and father.' '
Does the UPA express a preference for either the genetic or gestational
function? The California Supreme Court could find none in the statute's plain
language.22 The court said that the statute, by stating that the natural mother
may be established by "proof of [her] having given birth[,]" indicates that this
is one of the permitted, but not exclusive, means of establishing maternity."
Moreover, the court noted that the provision concludes with a disjunctive--"or
24
under this Act"--thereby creating an alternative to proof of having given birth.

120. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781 ("[W]e are left with the undisputed evidence that
Anna, not Crispina, gave birth to the child and that Crispina, not Anna, is genetically
related to him. Both women thus have adduced evidence of a mother and child
relationship as contemplated by the Act."); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Ohio
Ct. C.P. 1994) (stating that "both would be considered the mother of the delivered child:
Carol, because she gave birth, and Shelly, because she provided the genetic makeup or
imprint").
121. Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 763; see also Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781 (stating that
"for any child California law recognizes only one natural mother, despite advances in
reproductive technology rendering a different outcome biologically possible"). In
reaching this decision, the California Supreme Court declined the suggestion of the
American Civil Liberties Union, an amicus curiae in the case, to find that the child had
two mothers. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781 n.8. The court said that "[e]ven though rising
divorce rates have made multiple parent arrangements common in our society, we see no
compelling reason to recognize such a situation here." Id. The court noted that the
genetic parents had provided the child with a stable, intact, and nurturing home since
shortly after 'birth and that recognizing parental rights in the surrogate mother would
diminish the genetic mother's role. Id.
Support for the "one mother" position also can be found in the text of the statute
itself, which refers to the relationship between "the" natural mother and child. UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 297-98 (1987) ("The parent and child relationship
between a child and (1) the natural mother may be established... .") (emphasis added).
This use of the singular would support a plain language analysis that the drafters of the
UPA, and the legislators who adopted the law, intended to recognize only one mother.
dissenting) ("By its use of the phrase "the
See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 795 (Kennard, J.,
natural mother," . . . the UPA contemplates that a child will have only one natural
mother.") (emphasis added).
The Ohio court reached this same conclusion by considering the legislative history
and purpose of the Act. Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 763 (noting that surrogacy technology did
not exist when the statute was enacted and, therefore, "[i]t must therefore be assumed that
the [legislature] did not intend for the law to result in two mothers. This conclusion is
buttressed by the fact that the Uniform Parentage Act was intended to address solely the
question of legitimacy of a child and not surrogacy.") (citation omitted).
122. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781.
123. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874
(1993).
124. Id.
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From a historical perspective, the court noted, it is unclear exactly what role
the childbirth test plays in establishing a child's biological mother. Although the
test follows the maxim of materest quam gestation demonstat (by gestation the
mother is demonstrated), the court noted that the word "demonstrated" suggests
an ambiguity:
It is arguable that, while gestation may demonstrate maternal status,
it is not the sine qua non of motherhood. Rather, it is possible that the
common law viewed genetic consanguinity as the basis for maternal
rights. Under this latter interpretation, gestation simply would be
irrefutable evidence of the more fundamental genetic relationship. 2
Concluding that the ambiguity is not explicitly resolved in the Act, 2 6 the
court developed its own rule to break the statutory tie between gestational and
genetic mother, ultimately awarding parentage to the person(s) who "intended"
to produce and parent the child. 127 Although this position has been followed by
other courts in California and New York, a dissenting judge in California has
suggested that a "best interests of the child" analysis would provide a more
appropriate tie-breaker. An Ohio court, on the other hand, concluded that
genetics should be the determinative factor. These cases are discussed in greater
detail below.
a. The Intent Test
By looking at the intentions of the parties, courts in California and New
York have awarded parentage to the genetic mother in one case and to the
gestational mother in another. In the most recent case, however, a California
appellate court ruled in favor of a woman who had neither genetic nor
gestational ties to the child.
The two California cases involved voluntary surrogacy arrangements. In
28
the first of these decisions, Johnson v. Calvert,1
the embryo was produced from
the sperm and ova of the intending parents and implanted in the surrogate
mother. When the relationship deteriorated between the surrogate and the
intending parents near the end of the pregnancy, the intending parents filed a
lawsuit seeking a declaration that they were the legal parents of the unborn

125. Id. at 781-82 (quoting Hill, supra note 19, at 370); see also Belsito, 644
N.E.2d at 763 ("[G]iving birth was synonymous with providing the genetic makeup of
the child that was born. Birth and blood/genetics were one.").
126. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
127. Id. at 782.
128. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
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child. 29 The surrogate mother answered with her own action to be declared the
child's mother. 3
Because both mothers presented sufficient proof of maternity under
California's version of the UPA, the court found the parties' intentions, as
manifested in the surrogacy agreement, dispositive.13 ' The court noted that the
intending couple, desiring to have children of their own genetic stock,
affirmatively intended to create a child and took the necessary steps to arrange
for that to happen.3 The surrogate mother, on the other hand, agreed to
facilitate the birth of the other couple's child. 3 Accordingly, the court
concluded that:
[A]lthough the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving
birth as means of establishing a mother and child relationship, when
the two means do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to
procreate the child-that is, she who intended to bring about the birth
of a child that she intended
to raise as her own-is the natural mother
34
under California law.
The court explained, in dictum, how the test would work when the roles are
reversed-when the gestational mother has the requisite intent and conceives
with genetic material from another woman. 3 5 The court stated that "in a true

129. Id. at 778.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 782.
132. Id.
133. Id. As the court explained:
Although the gestative function [the surrogate] performed was necessary to
bring about the child's birth, it is safe to say that Anna would not have been
given the opportunity to gestate or deliver the child had she, prior to
implantation of the zygote, manifested her own intent to be the child's
mother. No reason appears why [the surrogate's] later change of heart should
vitiate the determination that [the intending mother] is the child's natural
mother.
Id.
134. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782-83 (Cal.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874
(1993). The court found support for its conclusion in the writings of several legal
commentators. See Hill, supra note 19, at 415 (arguing that "while all of the players in
the procreative arrangement are necessary in bringing a child into the world, the child
would not have been born butfor the efforts ofthe intendedparents") (emphasis added);
Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An
Opportunityfor Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 323 (arguing that "[w]ithin
the context of artificial reproductive techniques, intentions that are voluntarily chosen,
deliberate, express and bargained-for ought presumptively to determine legal
parenthood").
135. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 n.10.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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'egg donation' situation, where a woman gestates and gives birth to a child
formed from the egg of another woman with the intent to raise the3child
as her
6
own, the birth mother is the natural mother under California law."'
A New York divorce court found this dictum persuasive when presented
with those facts the following year in McDonaldv. McDonald.'37 At issue was
the custody of twins that were delivered by a woman unable to conceive
naturally but successfully implanted with embryos created from her husband's
sperm and a donor's ova. 38 During the divorce proceedings, the husband moved
for immediate and sole custody of the twins on the ground that he was the "only
genetic and natural parent available" to the children. 39 The court disagreed,
following the California intent test to conclude that the wife was the child's
natural mother because she40 gestated and gave birth to the twins with the intent
to raise them as her own.

The most recent California case, In re MarriageofBuzzanca,141 tested the
limits of current reproductive technology, as well as the UPA's ability to respond
to that technology. The case arose when John and Luanne Buzzanca, a married
couple unable to have their own children, secured a surrogate mother to carry an
embryo produced from donor sperm and ova. 42 As a result, the child, named
Jaycee, was genetically unrelated to either the Buzzancas or the surrogate
mother. Less than a month before Jaycee was born, Mr.
Buzzanca filed for
43
divorce and disclaimed any responsibility for the child.
Because the gestational mother also made clear that she had no interest in
the child,'" the trial judge "reached an extraordinary conclusion: Jaycee had no
lawful parents."' 45 The news media promptly criticized the decision as contrary
to common sense---"How could the.., judge rule that the' 46
man responsible for
a child's creation, had no responsibility for her support?'
The answer is simple: because the UPA did not contemplate, and therefore
did not provide for, this extraordinary departure from the laws of nature. The
Act, as explained above, focuses primarily on biology to determine parentage. 47
Thus, the natural mother would be either the woman who gave birth or the
woman who was genetically related to the child-not Mrs. Buzzanca, who

136. Id.
137. 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).

138. Id. at 478.
139. Id. at 479.
140. Id. at 480.

141. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
142. Id. at 282.
143. Id.

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Ellen Goodman, The Disturbing Case of a High-Tech Orphan, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 14, 1997, at D7, availablein 1997 WL 6269483.
147. See supranotes 58-74 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
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provided neither the genetics nor the gestation of the child.' 48 Similarly, Mr.
Buzzanca could not be the father because he had not contributed the sperm 14 9 and
was not governed by the statutory presumption of paternity based upon marriage
to the natural mother.'
The facts also failed to fit within the artificial insemination provisions of the
Act because, as a technical matter, the process involved in vitro fertilization
rather than artificial insemination and, more importantly, the woman who was
impregnated was not Mr. Buzzanca's wife.' The appellate court looked past
the plain language of the statute, however, to find a legislative intent in the
artificial insemination provision to assign paternity to the "person who caused
a child to come into being" notwithstanding that person's lack of a biological tie
to the child.'
Just as a husband is deemed to be the lawful father of a child unrelated
to him when his wife gives birth after artificial insemination, so should
a husband and wife be deemed the lawful parents of a child after a
surrogate mother bears a biologically unrelated child on their behalf.
In each instance, a child is procreated because a medical procedure
was initiated and consented to by intended parents.15
The appellate court also found support in the "intent test" enunciated in
Johnson. Indeed, the Johnson opinion anticipated this scenario, stating in
dictum, that "[i]n... the extremely rare situation in which neither the gestator
nor the woman who provided the ovum for fertilization is willing to assume
custody of the child after birth, a rule recognizing the intending parents as the
child's legal, natural parents should best promote certainty and stability for the
54
child."
The Buzzanca court rejected Mr. Buzzanca's argument that Johnson's
"intent test" should be applied only when the intended parents have a biological
tie to the child.' 5 According to the Buzzanca court, "[t]he context was not
limited to just Johnson-style contests between women who gave birth and
women who contributed ova, but to any situation where a child would not have

148. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
The trial court did not assign parental status to the gestational mother but, instead,
accepted a stipulation that neither the surrogate nor her husband were the "biological"

parents. Id.
149. Id.
150. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (a), 9B U.L.A. 298-99 (1987).

151. See id. § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987).
152. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 286.

153. Id. at 282.
154. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874

(1993).
In re Marriage
of Buzzanca,
72 of
Cal.
Rptr.
2d 280, 290
(Cal Ct. App.
1998).
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been born 'but for the efforts of the intended parents."" 5 6 In short, "for all
practical purposes [Mr. Buzzanca] caused Jaycee's conception
every bit as much
57
as if things had been done the old-fashioned way."'
b. The Best Interests Test
An alternative test was suggested by the dissenting justice in Johnson v.
Calvert.158 Justice Kennard agreed with the majority that the state's parentage
act allowed both the gestational and genetic mother to establish proof of
maternity and that the court needed to recognize some way of breaking the tie
between these two individuals. 5 9 But she argued that a "best interests of the
child" analysis more appropriately addressed "the paramount concern," which6
is "the well-being of the child that gestational surrogacy has made possible."'
The allocation of parental rights and responsibilities necessarily
impacts the welfare of a minor child. And in issues of child welfare,
the standard that courts frequently apply is the best interests of the
child.... This "best interests" standard serves to assure that in the
judicial resolution of disputes affecting a child's well-being, protection
of the minor child is the foremost consideration. 6
Under this standard, the court's objective would be to determine "who can
best assume the social and legal responsibilities of motherhood for a child born
of a gestational surrogacy arrangement."' 62 Justice Kennard stated that this
determination should not turn on the parties' relative economic circumstances,
which would typically favor the genetic parents who hired the surrogate, but
should tum instead on factors pertinent to good parenting,' 63 such as "the ability
to nurture the child physically and psychologically.., to provide ethical and
intellectual guidance ... [and] the 'well recognized right' of every child 'to

156. Id. at 291.
157. Id. at 291. The court stated that the artificial insemination statute codifies the
common law rule of "parenthood by common law estoppel." Id. at 288. "[A] reasonable
man who... actively participates and consents to his wife's artificial insemination in the
hope that a child will be produced whom they will treat as their own, knows that such
behavior carries with it the legal responsibilities of fatherhood and criminal responsibility
for nonsupport." Id. at 286 (quoting People v. Sorenson, 437 P.2d 495, 499 (Cal. 1968)).
158. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 795 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 799-800 (Cal.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874
(1993).
161. Id. at 799 (citations omitted).
162. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
163. Id. at 800.
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stability and continuity."" The6gestational mother's intent to procreate would
be relevant, but not dispositive.' 1
Justice Kennard acknowledged that a best interests test would require a
case-by-case evaluation and, therefore, would not promote certainty in
determining parentage. 166 But the individualized assessment would provide
many protections for the parties, "such as judicial oversight, legal counsel, and
an opportunity for the court to determine who best can provide for the child."'167
c. The Preference for Genetics
The Ohio Court of Common Pleas rejected both the "intent" and "best
18
interests" tests in favor of a bright-line standard favoring the genetic parent(s).
The court criticized the "intent test" as unworkable for several reasons, perhaps
most significantly because it failed to fully recognize the historical preference
for genetic relations and the genetic provider's fundamental rights to decide
whether to procreate and raise a child of one's own genes.' 69 Accordingly, the
court held that genetics should prevail over gestation unless
the genetic parents
17
waived those rights in favor of the gestational surrogate.
The court stated that procreation, which it defined as "the replication of the
unique genes of an individual," should occur only with that individual's
consent.'17 Moreover, the court found that any decision to implant genetic
material into a surrogate mother with the understanding that the surrogate would
raise the resulting child involved the surrender of parental rights.' 72 "If we are
to respect the right of procreation and parentage when a gestational surrogate is
used, one of the first questions asked must concern consent of the genetic

164. Id. (citations omitted).
165. Id.
166. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 800 (Cal.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874

(1993).
167. Id.
168. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 764-66 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994).

169. Id. The court also found the "intent test" unworkable because it would be
difficult to prove intent in some cases and because the test conflicted with two public
policies. Id. at 764-65. The first is the policy against enforcing or encouraging private
agreements to give up parental rights. Id. at 765. The second is the policy underlying

the state adoption laws, i.e., giving a natural mother an "unpressured opportunity before
a disinterested magistrate to surrender her parental rights[;]" providing a means to review
the suitability ofadoptive parents; and promoting stability in the child-parent relationship
by issuing ajudicial determination that clearly terminates the rights of the natural parents

and establishes those of the adopting parents. Id.
170. Id. at 766-67.
171. Id. at 766.
Id.
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parents. The Johnson test fails to give that priority, and thus fails to provide
adequate protection of basic rights."' 73
The court found it significant that historically and at common law, the
primary means of establishing parentage was through blood relations, and in
74
modem society, the term "blood relations" equates to shared DNA or genetics.
Although the female who gave birth is considered to be the natural parent, the
court stated that "[t]he rationale behind that rule.., is that for millennia, giving
birth was synonymous with providing the genetic makeup of the child that was
born. Birth and blood/genetics were one."' 75
The court noted that recognizing the genetic parent as the natural parent is
in the best interests of the child and society because "[t]he genetic parent can
guide the child from experience through the strengths and weaknesses of a
common ancestry of genetic traits."' 76 In addition, the court found that the rule
would avoid or minimize the concerns of a surrogate selling her right to be
determined the natural parent,' and the genetics test would be
easier to apply
78
because of the certainty allowed by modem genetics testing.
The court recognized that, in some cases, a genetically unrelated surrogate
mother (such as in the McDonald case discussed above)' 79 may wish to be
recognized as the legal parent. 80 To address this scenario, the court adopted a
two-part inquiry, starting from the position that a child's natural parents are those
determined by their genetic link to the child. Thus, the second part of the
inquiry-determining the persons who will raise the child-must be determined
by the consent of the genetic parents.181 If the genetic parents have not waived
or relinquished their rights, then they will be determined to be the legal
parents.'
In short, "the birth test becomes subordinate and secondary to
'
genetics."' 83

173. Id.
174. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 766.
177. Id. "Since she has not contributed to the genetics of the child, and the genetic
parent or parents have not waived their rights, she cannot be determined the natural
parent. She cannot sell a right she does not have." Id. This view is somewhat circular,
however, and discounts the procreative and parental rights of the gestational mother. See
infra notes 292-307 and accompanying text.
178. Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 766.
179. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
180. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760,767 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994). The court found
support for this proposition in the adoption laws and in the state's artificial insemination
law-all of which allow someone other than the genetic parent to become the legal parent
if the genetic parent relinquishes or waives the rights and duties of parentage. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
183. Id.
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C. Summary
Courts and legislatures have taken divergent paths in trying to adapt
traditional parentage laws, which are aimed at identifying the biological parent,
to disputes involving children conceived through modem reproductive
technology. When faced with children who have both a genetic mother and a
gestational mother as a result of voluntary surrogacy arrangements, states have
had to make difficult legal and policy decisions in choosing between the two.
Some states have opted for a bright-line test, simply declaring a preference
for one or the other, such as the Ohio court's common law rule favoring the
genetic parent or state statutes preferring the gestational mother. Other states
have adopted more flexible standards, looking to either the intent of the parties
or the best interests of the child in order to determine parentage. Each decision
has required a careful consideration of existing legal theories and public policy.
Until recently, these parentage disputes have arisen only in cases involving
voluntary surrogacies, in which a surrogate mother has expressly agreed to carry
a child to be raised by someone else. The California fertility clinic scandal,'8
however, raises the specter of involuntary or accidental surrogacies-those in
which a genetic mother's fertilized egg is implanted into another woman as a
result of theft or misdelivery. The following section attempts to define a
standard to be applied in those cases.

Im. DETERMINING PARENTAL RIGHTS WHEN GENETIC MATERIAL IS
MISDELIVERED OR STOLEN

Although courts and legislatures have taken several different tracks in
determining parentage in cases of assisted reproduction, all of the approaches
represent a balancing of two fundamental considerations: the rights of the
parents (or would-be parents) and the best interests of the child. This Section

analyzes these interests to determine how they may be best accommodated in
determining parentage of a child born to a gestational mother implanted with the

genetic material of another without the latter's consent.

A. ParentalRights
The parental rights doctrine, as explained in preceding sections, has a long
common law heritage and is constitutionally protected. The difficulty in cases
involving modem reproductive technology, however, is to determine who holds
these rights. Courts and commentators have suggested a variety of legal theories
and public policy considerations to guide this determination in the voluntary
surrogacy cases. For the reasons discussed below, none of these theories or

See supra notes
1-10 and
accompanying
text.
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policies provides a definitive answer for cases involving stolen or misdelivered
genetic material.

1. Property Theory
Basic property law provides a potential analytical framework for cases of
stolen or misdelivered genetic material. Under this view, genetic material is
considered the property of the progenitors and, therefore, they have exclusive
rights to the fruits or profits from that property. As discussed below, however,
property law does not provide a perfect analogue.
Genetic material has been treated as property in some contexts, such as in
disputes between genetic providers and institutions holding the genetic material.
In York v. Jones,18 5 for example, the court applied basic property principles in a
dispute between a fertility clinic and a couple that had asked the clinic to transfer
their last remaining embryo to another facility. 6 The court held that the
cryopreservation agreement between the first fertility clinic and the genetic
providers created a bailment and that the clinic had an
obligation to return the
87
bailed property (the embryo) at the couple's request.
The California Supreme Court also alluded to property concepts when it
adopted the intent test in Johnson v. Calvert. 88 More specifically, the court
found support for its test in the writings of several commentators, including a
law review article which stated that "[t]he mental concept of the child is a
controlling factor of its creation, and the originators of the concept merit full
credit as conceivers."' 8 9 Dissenting Justice Kennard observed that this concept

185. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
186. Id. at 425.

187. Id. The court's reasoning is as follows:
While the parties in this case expressed no intent to create a bailment, under

Virginia law, no formal contract or actual meeting of the minds is necessary.
Rather, all that is needed "is the element of lawful possession however

created, and duty to account for the thing as the property of another that
creates the bailment ......

In the instant case, the requisite elements of a bailment relationship are
present. It is undisputed that the Jones Institutes' possession of the pre-zygote
was lawful pursuant to the Cryopreservation Agreement. The defendants also
recognized their duty to account for the pre-zygote by virtue of a paragraph
in the Cryopreservation Agreement purporting to disclaim liability for any
injury to the pre-zygote. Finally, the defendants consistently refer to the
pre-zygote as the "property" of the Yorks in the Cryopreservation Agreement.
Id. (citations omitted).
188. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993); see supra notes
129-37 and accompanying text.
189. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783 (quoting Andrea E.Stumpf, Note, Redefining
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
Mother:
A Legal Matrixfor New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 196
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is "comfortingly familiar" because it has its roots in basic intellectual property
law, i.e., "an idea belongs to its creator because the idea is a manifestation of the
creator's personality or self."' 90
One major problem with employing a pure property analogy, however, as
Justice Kennard
and several commentators have pointed out, is that children are
91

not property.'

While it is true that at common law parental rights were in many ways
strikingly similar to property rights, this similarity no longer exists.
Thus, while a sperm or egg donor may have something approximating
a property right in his or her gametes, their status with respect to an
embryo is less certain. The continuum running between the
jurisprudential categories of property and personhood is unclear. For
example, the progenitors of a frozen embryo awaiting implantation in
the uterus may be treated as property owners in some contexts and as
prospective parents in others. But
certainly, upon birth, the property
92
metaphor is no longer apposite.
Accordingly, courts have struggled to define the status of embryos and
other genetic material, with more recent decisions rejecting the strict property
analogy in favor of an entirely new classification. 93 In Davis v. Davis,194 for

(1986)).
190. Id. at 796 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (quoting Justin Hughes, The Philosophy

ofIntellectualProperty,77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330 (1988)).
191. Id. Judge Kennard, in dissent, stated:
Unlike songs or inventions, rights in children cannot be sold for
consideration, or made freely available to the general public. Our most

fundamental notions ofpersonhood tell us it is inappropriate to treat children
as property. Although the law may justly recognize that the originator of a

concept has certain property rights in that concept, the originator of the
concept of a child can have no such rights, because children cannot be owned
as property.

Id. at 796.
192. Hill, supra note 19, at 392 (footnotes omitted).
193. The American Fertility Society has described the debate over the status of

preembryos as follows:
Three major ethical positions have been articulated in the debate over

preembryo status. At one extreme is the view of the preembryo as a human
subject after fertilization, which requires that it be accorded the rights of a
person. This position entails an obligation to provide an opportunity for
implantation to occur and tends to ban any action before transfer that might
harm the preembryo or that is not immediately therapeutic, such as freezing
and some preembryo research.
At the opposite extreme is the view that the preembryo has a status no
different
from anyofother
human
tissue.of With
the consent ofRepository,
those who have
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example, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that gamete providers have "an
interest in the nature of ownership" in the preembryos created from their eggs or
sperm, but the court emphasized that the interest was "not a true property
interest."' 95 At issue in Davis was the disposition of several preembryos upon
the divorce of the progenitors. The wife initially indicated that she still wanted
to use the preembryos to bear a child, but the husband objected because he did
not wish to become a parent outside the bounds of marriage.'96 The intermediate
appellate court relied on York v. Jones97 to award the Davises "joint custody"
of the preembryos, but the state supreme court criticized that view for
improperly implying that the couple's interest was a property interest.' 98
The state supreme court also rejected the trial court's view that preembryos
should be treated as persons.' 99 Instead, the court concluded that preembryos
"occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their
potential for human life."2" Although the progenitors do not have a true
property interest, "they do have an interest in the nature of ownership, to the
extent that they have
decision-making authority concerning disposition of the
20
preembryos ..... , 1
Because the Davises had not agreed on the disposition of the preembryos,
either at the time the preembryos were created or at the time of their divorce, the
court decided the case as an issue of procreational rights, balancing Mary Sue
Davis's right to procreate against Junior Davis's right to avoid procreation. 0 2

decision-making authority over the preembryo, no limits should be imposed
on actions taken with preembryos.
A third view-one that is most widely held-takes an intermediate
position between the other two. It holds that the preembryo deserves respect

greater than that accorded to human tissue but not the respect accorded to
actual persons. The preembryo is due greater respect than other human tissue
because of its potential to become a person and because of its symbolic
meaning for many people. Yet, it should not be treated as a person, because
it has not yet developed the features ofpersonhood, is not yet established as

developmentally individual, and may never realize its biologic potential.
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting American Fertility Society,
Ethical Considerationsofthe New Reproductive Technologies,J. AM. FERTILITY SOc'Y,
June 1990, at 34S-35S), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
194. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
195. Id. at 597.
196. Id. at 589. Mary Sue Davis later changed her mind and indicated that she
wished to donate the preembryos to another couple for implantation. Id. at 590.
197. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
198. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596-97.

199. Id. at 594-95.
200. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911
(1993).
201. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
202. Id. at 603-04.
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The court ultimately concluded that Junior Davis's right should prevail because
Mary Sue Davis's interest-to donate the preembryos to another couple-was
significantly less important than Junior Davis's interest in avoiding
parenthood." 3
A California appeals court relied upon Davis to hold that a sperm donor
who subsequently committed suicide had a property-type interest in his sperm

that became part of his estate when he died. °4 The dispute in Hecht v. Superior
Court concerned fifteen vials of frozen sperm that the decedent had conveyed to
his girlfriend through his will. 0 5 "Although [the sperm] has not yet been joined
with an egg to form a preembryo, as in Davis, the value of sperm lies in its
potential to create a child after fertilization, growth, and birth." 2°6 Accordingly,
the court held that the sperm donor, at the time of his death, "had an interest, in
the nature of ownership, to the extent that he had decision making authority as
to the use of his sperm for reproduction." The court concluded that this interest
was properly part of the decedent's estate, thereby giving the probate court
jurisdiction over the matter.20 7
In summary, the courts have begun to recognize a special status for genetic
material because of its potential to create human life. This theory has significant
implications with respect to the progenitor's procreational rights, discussed in
greater detail below, 20 8 but makes traditional property doctrines inapplicable.

203. Id. at 604. The court indicated that the case would be closer if Mary Sue
Davis had been seeking to use the preembryos herself and could not achieve parenthood
through any other reasonable means, including adoption. Id.
In a more recent decision on facts similar to the Davis case, the New York Court
of Appeals declined to address the status of the preembryos. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d
174 (N.Y. 1998). Instead, the court resolved the issue through the couple's agreement
with the fertility clinic, which stated that in the event that the couple was unable to make
a decision regarding the disposition of the frozen preembryos, the preembryos would be
donated to the in vitro fertilization program for research. Id. at 180.
204. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
205. Id. at 276-77.
206. Id. at 283. In reaching its decision, the appellate court found its case
distinguishable from Moore v. Regents of University of California, in which the
California Supreme Court held that a leukemia patient had no property interest in cells
that were removed from his body during treatment and subsequently used in potentially
lucrative medical research without his permission. Id. at 280-82 (citing Moore, 793 P.2d
479 (Cal. 1990)). The appeals court noted that the patient in Moore did not expect to
retain possession of his cells after removal. Id. at 280-81 n.4. The decedent in Hecht,
on the other hand, had demonstrated an intent to maintain control over his sperm through
his contract with the sperm bank. Id.
207. Id. at 283. The court emphasized, however, that its opinion did not address
the validity or enforceability of the will. Id. at 283, 284. Because of this and other
unadjudicated issues, the court denied as premature the girlfriend's petition to have the
sperm distributed to her. Id. at 284.
See infra notes
266-307School
and accompanying
text.
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Moreover, even if property principles were applied by analogy, a court
would likely conclude that the gestational mother has better title than the genetic
provider. Under the doctrine of accessions, as explained in the landmark case
of Wetherbee v. Green,2" "one whose property has been appropriated by another
without authority has a right to follow it and recover the possession from any one

who may have received it" even if the property has increased in value by the
addition of labor or money.2 0 But this rule is subject to an exception for
property that has changed form or otherwise has been improved significantly by
an innocent party.21 "When the right to the improved article is the point in issue,

the question, how much the property or labor of each has contributed to make it
what it is, must always be one of first importance. ' 22 Thus, the owner of raw
material such as wood loses title to it when it is converted into a musical
instrument because "in bringing it to its present condition the value of the labor
has swallowed up and rendered insignificant the value of the original
materials."2 3
Applying this analysis to a bifurcated reproductive process suggests that the
gestational mother would prevail because her physical investment is markedly
greater than that of the genetic mother. This is not to say that the genetic mother
has not made a significant investment. To the contrary, the physical removal of
her eggs is a risky and physically demanding process.2 4 But, as one scholar has
observed, the genetic mother's contribution might "seem trivial compared to the
'
rigors and the around the clock demands of pregnancy and childbirth."215
Indeed, another commentator has described the gestational period as thirty-eight
to forty weeks of "full time work-twenty-four hours a day, seven days a

209. 22 Mich. 311 (1871).
210. Id. at 313.
211. Id. at 315-21; RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY §§
6.1-6.3 (Walter B. Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975).

212. Wetherbee, 22 Mich. at 319.
213. Id. at 319-20.
214. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 790 (Cal.) (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("To
undergo superovulation and egg retrieval is taxing, both physically and emotionally; the

hormones used for superovulation produce bodily changes similar to those experienced
in pregnancy, while the surgical removal of mature eggs has been likened to caesariansection childbirth.") (citing CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY
117-18 (1989)), cert.denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993); Randy Frances Kandel, Which Came
First: The Mother or the Egg? A Kinship Solution to Gestational Surrogacy, 47

RUTGERS L. REv. 165, 188 (1994) ("The genetic mother suffers the risky surgical
removal of her eggs, often preceded by harrowing years of infertility treatments and
clinicalized sexual relations which have been carefully timed to coincide with her
ovulatory cycle.").
215. SCOTT B. RAE, THE ETHICS OF COMMERCIAL SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD, 8788 (1994) ("At the end of the process of birth, the woman who gives birth to the child
will have contributed much more of herself than the egg donor in order to bring about the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
child's
birth.").
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week-without any time off: 'Pregnancy
and childbirth are hazardous, time21 6
consuming, painful conditions.'
Consequently, when a gestational mother has produced a child from another
woman's genetic material, one reasonably could conclude that the gestational
mother's labor and materials made a significantly greater contribution to the final
product than the genetic mother's egg production. Accordingly, the gestational
mother would likely prevail under the accessions doctrine217 in the unlikely event
that a court accepts a pure property rights analysis for claims concerning
children.
2. Causation Theory
Courts also have alluded to tort principles-more specifically, the concept
of "but for" causation-in their analysis of the involuntary surrogacy cases. But
this standard is ambiguous in the context of stolen or misdelivered embryos.
The California Supreme Court's intent test in Johnson v. Calvert was
derived in part from the writings of Professor Hill, who observed that "while all
of the players in the [surrogacy] arrangement are necessary in bringing a child
into the world, the child would not have been born but for the efforts of the

intendedparents.... [T]he intended parents are the first cause, or the prime
movers, of the procreative relationship. 2 8 Thus, in Johnson, the court ruled in

216. Nancy W. Machinton, Comment, Surrogate Motherhood: Boon or BabySelling-The Unresolved Questions,71 MARQ. L. REv. 115, 125 (1987) (quoting Robert
C. Black, Legal Problems of SurrogateMotherhood, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 373, 380

(1981)); see also Kandel, supra note 214, at 188-89 (discussing the risks and stress of a
typical pregnancy and noting that "[t]he relative biological strangeness of the fetus to the
gestational mother, as compared to a woman carrying a child conceived through sexual

intercourse, demands an even greater biological investment from her during the
pregnancy").
217. This assumes, however, that the gestational mother innocently obtained the
other woman's genetic material and was not providing gestational services as part of a
surrogacy contract. The law has long recognized that a wrongdoer acquires no title in the
goods of another "either by the wrongful taking, or by any change wrought in them by
his labor or skill, however great that change may be." Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich.
311, 316 (1871). But see BROWN, supra note 211, § 6.2 (suggesting that it is
questionable whether the traditional view would be followed by modem courts when the
value of the resulting product is "out of all proportion" to the value of the original
materials). The application of this rule to misdelivered or stolen genetic material is
discussed further below. See infra notes 354-62 and accompanying text.
Similarly, title remains with the original property owner if he or she employs
another to fabricate a final product using the original materials as well as materials of the
employee or contractor. BROWN, supra note 211, § 6.3. Thus, in a surrogacy
arrangement, "the surrogate has no more of a claim to the 'property' ... than a builder
has in a house constructed for another." Hill, supra note 19, at 408.
Johnson, 851
P.2d at 782
(citingofHill,
note 19,Repository,
at 415).
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favor of the couple who arranged for a surrogate mother to carry and deliver the
child. The court observed that the surrogate mother's role was necessary to
bring about the child's birth, but "it is safe to say that [the surrogate mother]
would not have been given the opportunity to gestate or deliver the child had
she, prior to implantation
of the zygote, manifested her own intent to be the
219
child's mother.
Justice Kennard's dissent in Johnson criticized the use of the "but for" test,
arguing that under California law, causation is determined by a "substantial
factor" test rather than a "but for" analysis."2 Moreover, in her view, neither test
is dispositive in a contest between a genetic mother and a gestational mother
because "[b]oth... are 22indispensable to the birth of a child in a gestational
surrogacy arrangement. 1
The same arguments apply in the context of children born from stolen or
misdelivered genetic material. One could argue that the gestational mother is the
"but for" cause of the child's birth because she had the intent to have a child and
was carrying out this intent by having an-embryo implanted in her. Although the
genetic mother's eggs played a necessary role in producing the embryo, they
were not the "but for" cause of the pregnancy because the gestational mother
could have used someone else's genetic material. In the Jorges' case,222 in fact,
the gestational mother had no knowledge that the embryos implanted n her were
produced with Loretta Jorge's eggs; to the contrary, the gestational mother
believed that her own eggs were used.2u
Conversely, one could argue that the genetic mother is the "but for" cause
of the child's birth because she intended to have a child, as manifested by her
participation in the in vitro fertilization process and the harvesting of her eggs.2 24

219. Id. at 782.
220. Johnson v. Calvert, 951 P.2d 776, 795-96 (Cal.) (Kennard, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993). The "but for" test has been stated as follows: "[t]he
defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have occurred but for
that conduct; conversely, the defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event
would have occurred without it." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,

PROSSER

& KEETON ON THE

LAW OF TORTS

266 (5th ed. 1984). The substantial factor test recognizes that torts may
have multiple causes and therefore, a defendant's conduct is considered to be the cause
of an event if"it was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing it about." Id.
at 267.
221. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 796 ("The proposition that a woman who gives birth to

a child after carrying it nine months is a 'substantial factor' in the child's birth cannot
reasonably be debated. Nor can it reasonably be questioned that 'but for' the gestational
mother, there would not be a child.").

222. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
223. Similarly, if a gestational mother knows that she is using someone else's eggs,

she generally does not intend to do so without the donor's consent-and relinquishment
of rights to the genetic material and any child produced from it.
224.

This theory arguably would apply even in the cases where doctors

surreptitiously
removed eggs from fertility clinic patients who thought they were merely
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
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Thus, the genetic mother was the prime mover of the procreative process.
Although the gestational mother played a necessary role in producing the child,
the genetic mother could have achieved that same result by gestating the genetic
material herself or, like the intending parents in Johnson,by hiring a surrogate
who had no intent to produce a child for herself.
The only distinction, then, between the genetic and gestational mother is
timing. Both mothers have the intent and, presumably, the ability s to produce
the child. The gestational mother simply is the first to achieve implantation.
In short, this scenario presents one of the classic cases of multiple causes,
where each actor could have produced the result on her own but their actions in
fact concurred to bring about the event, and, therefore, suggests that the
"substantial factor" test would be the most appropriate.226 Under this test, as
Justice Kennard observed, both women "have substantial claims to legal
motherhood. Pregnancy entails a unique commitment, both psychological and
emotional, to an unborn child. No less substantial, however, is the contribution
of the woman from whose egg the child developed and without whose desire the
child would not exist. ' 227 Tort theory, therefore, does not dispose of the dispute,
but instead suggests that each woman is jointly responsible and would have an
equal claim.
3. Contract Theory

Contract theory is the third principle that courts and commentators have
relied upon in voluntary surrogacy cases. This theory also is inapplicable,
however, in cases of stolen or misdelivered genetic material.
Under the contract view, the parties to a voluntary surrogacy arrangement
are expected to fulfill the bargained-for expectations of the other parties to the
agreement. 2 8 Thus, a surrogate mother who has agreed to carry the child for

undergoing diagnostic examinations. See supra note 7. Although these women had not
consented to the removal and fertilization of their eggs, one could argue that they had
manifested an intent to conceive a child by undergoing the diagnostic examinations as
part of fertility treatment.
225. One could argue that the genetic mother's ability to conceive is questionable
in light of her resort to infertility treatments such as in vitro fertilization. That argument
incorrectly assumes that the treatments stem from a fertility problem of the genetic
mother; to the contrary, the problem may lie with the genetic mother's mate (or, in some
cases, the genetic mother may be seeking in vitro fertilization with donor sperm because
she does not have a mate).
226. PROSSER ET AL., supra note 220, at 266-67.
227. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 766, 788 (Cal.) (Kennard, J., dissenting), cert.

denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993).
228. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783. "Within the context of artificial reproductive
techniques... intentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargainedfor ought
determine
legal of
parenthood."
Id. (quoting
Majorie1999
Maguire
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someone else should not be allowed to renege on her agreement by subsequently
claiming rights in the child.n 9 Similarly, a progenitor who voluntarily agrees to
donate an egg or sperm to another should be precluded from claiming an interest
in a child born from that genetic material."
This theory has been criticized for failing to recognize that "courts will not
compel performance of all contract obligations"--particularly those involving
personal service3'-and that specific performance is especially inappropriate in
parentage cases. "Just as children are not the intellectual property of their
parents, neither are they the personal property of anyone, and their delivery
cannot be ordered as a contract remedy on the same terms that a court would,
for
2 32
example, order a breaching party to deliver a truckload of nuts and bolts."
But even assuming that the contract theory is valid in voluntary surrogacy
cases, the theory is inapposite to genetic material that has been misdelivered or
stolen because, by definition, there has been no agreement in the latter case. The
only agreement that exists is between the fertility clinic and each of its patients,
who typically stipulate that their genetic material (embryos or sperm) may be
frozen and storedfor theirown use23 and are not to be released from storage for
any purpose without the patients' consent." Although these agreements provide
for alternative dispositions, such as donation to other couples or for research,
such alternative dispositions would take place only if the genetic providers no
longer intended to use the genetic material for themselves or are unable (such as
in the case of a divorce) to make a decision regarding disposition.235

Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunityfor
Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 323).

229. Hill, supra note 19, at 415-16.
230. Id.
231, Johnson, 851 P.2d at 796 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (noting that "even when
a party to a contract for personal services (such as employment) has wilfully breached
the contract, the courts will not order specific enforcement of an obligation to perform
that personal service").
232. Id. at 796-97 (Kennard, J., dissenting).

233. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 176 (N.Y. 1998) (quoting from
agreement in which patients consented to retrieval of more eggs than could be transferred

in one in vitro fertilization cycle but stipulated that "[t]he excess eggs are to be
inseminated and cryopreserved for possible use by us during a later IVF cycle"); see also
Kelleher & Christensen, supra note 3 (Jorges signed a form directing that all of Mrs.
Jorge's eggs be fertilized with Mr. Jorge's sperm and used by them to achieve
pregnancy).

234. See, e.g., Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176 (quoting from agreement which stated that
the progenitors have "the principal responsibility to decide the disposition of our frozen
pre-zygotes. Our frozen pre-zygotes will not be released from storage for any purpose
without the written consent of both of us ....
).
235. Id. The agreement signed by Maureen and Steve Kass provided that:
2. In the event that we no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy or are unable to
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
make a decision regarding the disposition of our stored, frozen pre-zygotes,
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The contract with the fertility clinic (or sperm bank) could be modified to
provide for waiver of parental rights-either by the gestational parent or the
genetic parent-in the event that genetic material is switched by mistake or theft.
Given the patients' strong desire to have children, however, it seems unlikely
that they would knowingly and voluntarily waive these rights at the outset of
their fertility treatment. Moreover, it raises questions such as: Which parent(s)
or the genetic
would a standardized agreement prefer-the gestational parent
236
providers? Or should the preference be left to the patient?
In short, contract theory may provide a principled, though controversial,
means of resolving disputes for voluntary surrogacy cases. But like its tort and
property counterparts, it fails to provide a definitive resolution of parentage
issues in cases of misdelivered or stolen genetic material.
4. Public Policy Concerns
Voluntary surrogacy arrangements have raised a number of public policy
concems, prompting many states to enact legislation prohibiting or regulating the
practice. 23' Some of these public policy issues have no relevance outside the
arena of voluntary surrogacy arrangements, but others do require consideration
in the context of switched genetic material.
The primary objection to voluntary surrogacy arrangements is the
possibility they present for baby brokering, the exchange of parental rights for
money or other valuable consideration in adoption or related proceedings. 38

we now indicate our desire for the disposition of the pre-zygotes and direct
the IVF program to (choose one):
(b) Our frozen pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF Program for

biological studies and be disposed of by the IVF program for approved
research investigation as determined by the IVF Program.
Id. at 176-77.
236. This scenario would respect the personal choices that patients might make, but
it presents the possibility of mismatched preferences, i.e., where the gestational parent
would specify that the genetic parent(s) take priority and the genetic parents waive their

rights in favor of the gestational parent.
237. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
238. Alice Hofheimer, Note, GestationalSurrogacy: Unsettling State Parentage
Law and SurrogacyPolicy, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 571, 580-91 (1992). The
New Jersey Supreme Court described the myriad of evils inherent in baby bartering as
follows:
The child is sold without regard for whether the purchasers will be suitable

parents.... The natural mother does not receive the benefit of counseling
and guidance to assist her in making a decision that may affect her for a
lifetime. In fact, the monetary incentive to sell her child may, depending on
her financial circumstances, make her decision less voluntary. Furthermore,
the adoptive parents may not be fully informed of the natural parents' medical
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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Thus, many states have enacted statutes that prohibit or restrict agreements that
require the surrogate to relinquish parental rights, particularly if the arrangement
is commercial in nature.2 39 In the absence of specific legislation on surrogacy
arrangements, several courts similarly have held that such agreements are void
for violating state statutes or public policy prohibiting baby-selling.24
Baby-selling laws are irrelevant, however, to disputes over children born
from switched genetic material because neither the genetic mother nor the
gestational mother has agreed to transfer parental rights for money. In fact, the
dispute arises because both mothers are asserting an intent to keep and raise the

child.
Baby-selling laws aside, courts have found that surrogacy arrangements
conflict with other state laws and policies, such as: (1) laws requiring proof of
parental unfitness or abandonment before termination of parental rights or
adoption is allowed; (2) laws that make surrender of custody and consent to
adoption revocable in private placement adoptions; and (3) the public policy of
assuring equal rights for both natural parents.24 But, again, these concerns have

history.
Baby-selling potentially results in the exploitation of all parties
involved. Conversely, adoption statutes seek to further humanitarian goals,
foremost among them the best interests of the child. The negative
consequences of baby-buying are potentially present in the surrogacy context,
especially the potential for placing and adopting a child without regard to the
interest of the child or the natural mother.
In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1241-42 (N.J. 1988) (citations and footnote omitted); see
also Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 792 (Cal.) (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("Surrogacy
critics... maintain that the payment of money for the gestation and relinquishment of
a child threatens the economic exploitation of poor women who may be induced to
engage in commercial surrogacy arrangements out of financial need."), cert.denied, 510
U.S. 874 (1993); Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209,
211 (Ky. 1986) (stating that statute "is intended to keep baby brokers from overwhelming
an expectant mother or the parents of a child with financial inducements to part with the
child").
239. See Holheimer, supra note 238, at 581 (stating that most statutes "reach only
those agreements that require a surrogate to relinquish parental or custodial rights and
thus appear to permit arrangements that do not involve the transfer of parental rights" and
a majority of the statutes "afford different treatment to commercial and noncommercial
arrangements, generally voiding or criminalizing participation in the former, and ignoring
or regulating the latter"); supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1240-42 (N.J. 1988) (stating that
although the surrogacy agreement specified that the fee was being paid for the surrogate
mother's services and expenses and not for giving up parental rights, the court concluded
that the payments were in fact made in connection with an adoption); In re Adoption of
Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990) (holding that surrogacy agreement
violated New York's "well-established policy against trafficking in children").
241. Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1242-47; see also Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
765-66 (Ohio Ct. C. P. 1994) (stating that surrogacy arrangements fail to provide
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little significance outside voluntary surrogacies. These laws and policies are

intended to protect parental rights, but they beg the question of who is entitled
to such rights. These laws and policies do not dictate which of two potential
mothers must be declared the legal parent of a child produced from a stolen or
misdelivered embryo; rather, they establish the rights that must be accorded the
legal parent after a parentage determination is made.
Two policy issues that do have validity in switched genetic material cases
as well as voluntary surrogacy cases are the concerns about the devaluation of
the role of the gestational mother242 and the psychological effects of requiring a
gestational mother to relinquish a child she has nurtured in her body for nine
months.243 With respect to the first issue, critics have long condemned surrogacy
arrangements for "dehumanizing" women by treating the surrogate as a
"container" or a "rented womb." 24 Parentage decisions created by switched
genetic material have the same dehumanizing potential, particularly if the state's
law expresses an inflexible preference for genetic parents, as inthe Ohio court's
decision in Belsito v. Clark,2 45 and thereby discounts the
significancei of the
2 46
gestational mother's contribution to the birth of the child.
protections of state adoption laws and conflict with state policy prohibiting surrender of
parental rights by private contracts); cf Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 798 (Cal.)
(Kennard, J., dissenting) (observing that surrogacy arrangements lack protections of the
USCACA, i.e., judicial oversight, legal counsel for the gestational mother, medical and
mental health evaluations, and a requirement that all parties meet the standards of fitness
for adoptive parents), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993).
242. See, e.g., Johnson, 851 P.2d at 798 (Kennard, J., dissenting). This argument
often is linked with a criticism that surrogacy arrangements "'comrodify' women and
children by treating the female reproductive capacity and the children born of gestational
surrogacy arrangements as products that can be bought and sold." Id. at 792 (citation
omitted). This commodification argument is inapplicable to the case of switched genetic
material, however, for the same reasons discussed above in relation to the baby-selling
statutes.
243. Id. at 792 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 792, 797-98 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("A pregnant woman intending
to bring a child into the world is more than a mere container or breeding animal; she is
a conscious agent of creation no less than the genetic mother, and her humanity is
implicated on a deep level.");

BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD-

IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY INAPATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 244 (1989) (expressing concern

that when technology is used in a surrogacy arrangement, the birth mother "is declared
to be only a 'rented womb,' ... and the real mother is declared to be the woman who
produced the egg").
245. See supra notes 168-83 and accompanying text.
246. Indeed, as one commentator has acknowledged, the gestational mother's
physical involvement in the procreative process is superior to that of a genetic provider,
stating that:
The birth mother risks sickness and inconvenience during pregnancy. She
faces the certain prospect of painful labor. She even risks the small but
qualitatively infinite possibility of death. Throughout all of this discomfort
Published
by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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Similarly, a woman who mistakenly gestates someone else's embryo is
likely to experience the same prenatal bonding as a surrogate mother and,
therefore, suffer from the same psychological impact of relinquishing the child
after birth. In fact, the impact may be even greater in the case of switched
genetic material than in the voluntary surrogacy context because in the latter
scenario, the surrogate mother entered into the arrangement with knowledge that
she was carrying the child for someone else and, therefore, may not have
developed a deep attachment to it.247
Yet, a genetic parent may also suffer psychological trauma if his or her
genetic offspring is awarded to the gestational mother. As one commentator
observed: "It is beyond dispute that an important aspect of parenthood is the
experience of creating another in one's 'own likeness.' .. . The significance of
the genetic connection between parent and child undoubtedly is part of what
makes infertility a painful experience . . ."and creates a desire to use
reproductive technologies to create a child rather than to adopt someone else's. 8
The genetic connection also may create a sense of responsibility in the
genetic provider, as recognized in the Davis v. Davis case.249 In upholding
Junior Davis's right to avoid procreation against his wife's interest in donating
their preembryos to an infertile couple, the court noted Mr. Davis's concern that
his offspring be raised in a suitable environment.25 The court recognized that
refusal to permit donation of the embryos would impose on Mary Sue Davis "the
burden of knowing that the lengthy IVF procedures she underwent were futile,
and that the preembryos to which she contributed genetic material would never
become children[,]" but the court concluded that this burden was less significant
than Junior Davis's interest in avoiding parenthood."' "If she were allowed to
donate these preembryos, he would face a lifetime of either wondering about his
parental status or knowing about his parental status but having no control over
it:1252

and uncertainty, it is her body which remains the cradle for the growing fetus.
By comparison, the physical involvement of the sperm donor is de minimis.
While the egg donor physically risks more than the sperm donor, her level of
physical involvement pales in comparison with that of the gestational host.
Hill, supra note 19, at 408 (footnote omitted).
247. See Hill, supra note 19, at 406 (stating that more study is needed, but
hypothesizing that "[i]f the postrelinquishment experience of birth mothers is at all
related to their previous feelings regarding the child, then it is possible that women who
do not expect to raise the child may be relatively less affected by relinquishment").
248. Id. at 389.
249. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
250. Id. at 603-04. As a child of divorced parents, he was "vehemently opposed
to fathering a child that would not live with both parents." Id. at 604.
251. Id. at 604.
252. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
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The strength of this genetic tie is illustrated by the Jorges' reaction upon
learning that another couple was raising children born from Mrs. Jorge's eggs. 53
An attorney gave the Jorges the address of the birth parents on the condition that
they not try to contact the children.254 The Jorges, however, could not resist
going to the birth parents' neighborhood the next day so that Basilio Jorge could
"see if [the birth father] can support the children." 25 On subsequent occasions,
the Jorges made arrangements to have the children videotaped at the bus stop,
and Loretta Jorge herself took a still photograph of one of the twins outside the
child's school. 6 Their attorney said the photographs were taken because "that
is all she has of these children."" 7 Other highly publicized cases have shown a
similar desire by mothers to be rejoined with their genetic offspring.25
In short, both gestational and genetic parents have made significant
contributions, both biologically and psychologically, to the procreation of a child
born from stolen or misdelivered genetic material. Accordingly, there is no
compelling public policy justification for choosing one set of parents over the
other.

253. See Kelleher & Christensen, supranote 3, at Al.
254. See Kelleher & Christensen, supra note 3, at Al.
255. See Kelleher & Christensen, supra note 3, at Al.
256. See Kelleher & Christensen, supra note 3, at Al.
257. Kelleher & Christensen, supra note 3, at Al. The Jorges have replayed the
videotape over and over, and Loretta Jorge sees her own image recreated in the children.
"That's the way I walked when I was a little girl... And she's very bossy, just like I
was."

258. Mary Beth Whitehead, the surrogate mother in Baby M who realized after
birth that she could not give up the child, fled to another state with the baby when the
intended parents initiated a custody suit. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1237 (N.J. 1988)
(stating that Mrs. Whitehead also made threats "to kill herself, to kill the child, and to

falsely accuse Mr. Stem of sexually molesting Mrs. Whitehead's other daughter").
Regina and Ernest Twigg, who alleged that their daughter was switched with another
infant in the hospital after birth, also engaged in extreme measures that were criticized
by the court. Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624, at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Aug. 18, 1993). The court stated:

[The Twiggs'] position is that their interests, whatever they might be, are
paramount. They believe that Kimberly's wishes, feelings and interests
should not be considered in this case. They remain firmly convinced that
Robert Mays played a knowing and intentional part in the "swap" and show

no intention of ever giving up that conviction. They caused false letters to the
editor to be printed in the newspaper printed in Kimberly Mays' hometown,
the only effect of which was to further traumatize her. It would be difficult
to conclude that this conduct showed "substantial concern for the welfare" of
Kimberly.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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5. The Intent Test
The most progressive view urged by commentators and adopted by two
courts in voluntary surrogacy cases is to determine parentage based upon the

intent of the parties. 59 This position has considerable merit in voluntary
surrogacies because the very premise of a surrogacy arrangement is that the
gestational mother intends to bear a child for another person or persons or,
conversely, a genetic provider intends to donate eggs or sperm to a gestational
mother who intends to raise the child. Yet, to the extent that this theory relies
upon the property, tort, and contract theories discussed above, the intent test has
already been discredited as a reliable determinant in cases of switched genetic
material. More importantly, however, the test simply does not work for all such
cases.
The intent test certainly might be helpful in some cases involving stolen or
misdelivered genetic material. One example might be a genetic mother who has
genetic material in storage but has subsequently decided that she no longer
desires to use it for herself, perhaps because she was able to bear a child through
a previous in vitro fertilization treatment or because her marital circumstances
have changed. Similarly, a gestational mother might disclaim an interest in a
child that is not her genetic offspring. Although many gestational mothers are
likely to feel a bond with the child notwithstanding their original desire to have
their own genetic offspring,
some gestational parents may prefer not to raise a
260
child that is not their own.
The intent test works, then, in the limited circumstances in which only one
mother maintains an intent to parent the child. As a practical matter, there would
be no real dispute in such cases because one set of prospective parents is
voluntarily waiving their claim to the child. The intent test, therefore, merely
allows courts to formalize the parentage determination and take care of
formalities such as changing the birth certificate and officially extinguishing the
claims of the non-intending parents.26'

259. See supra notes 128-57 and accompanying text.
260. A recent Florida case illustrates one way in which this might arise. Michael
and Elizabeth Higgins underwent in vitro fertilization in 1994 and Elizabeth gave birth
to twins the following year. FatherIsn't the Father: Couple File Suit, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Nov. 14, 1996, at D1, available in 1996 WL 12425965. Although Michael
Higgins is African-American, the twins appear to be Caucasian like their mother and the
couple's lawsuit alleges that "[i]t became immediately apparent that the children did not
appear to be a product of their union." Id. Their attorney stated that Michael Higgins
could not bond with the children, which caused marital discord leading to the couple's
separation. Id.
261. For examples of statutory provisions authorizing the substitution of birth
certificates following ajudicial order of parentage, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(c)(2)
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
(Michie
1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.16(8) (West 1998).
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The test is unsuitable, however, in other cases of switched genetic material.
The classic example is presented by prospective parents who have stored frozen
embryos for later attempts at implantation if their first attempt at implantation
fails or if they desire additional children. This couple obviously intends to use

the embryo to produce a child for themselves. The gestational mother, likewise,
intends to bear a child for herself. She may believe that the embryo is her own
or that it was produced from donated gametes, but in any event, she had no
intention of carrying the child for someone else.
Loretta Jorge provides an example of a case in which the intent test fails.
She went to a fertility clinic with the intent to conceive and bear her own genetic
offspring. It is unclear from news reports whether she knew that some of her
eggs were still in storage or whether they were misdelivered immediately after
being removed from Mrs. Jorge. What is clear, however, is that she did not
intend for her eggs to be transferred to another woman, nor did the gestational
mother intend to have someone else's eggs implanted in her.262
One writer has suggested that the intent test could be adapted to declare
parentage in the parent(s) who had the specific intent to produce a childfrom this
particularembryo.263 Thus, a genetic mother would prevail over a gestational
mother whose specific intent was to produce her own genetic offspring.' 6 The
test also would favor the gestational mother who intended to produce a child
from donated genetic material over a genetic mother who
26 has stored her eggs or
embryos for use at some indefinite time in the future.
The latter scenario, however, disregards the genetic mother's intent in
preserving the genetic material in the first place-to save it for her own attempts
to initiate pregnancy at a later date. Perhaps more importantly, however, the

262. This same analysis applies to the California cases in which eggs were
surreptitiously taken from women during diagnostic examinations. See supra note 7.
These women most likely sought treatment at the fertility clinic in order to have their
own children and had no intent to provide eggs for another woman. In fact, some
expressly refused consent when asked if they wanted to donate extra eggs to infertile
women. See Marcida Dodson, FertilityPatientOks $460,000 UC Settlement Litigation,
Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 20, 1998, at B4, availablein 1998 WL 2400729 (describing
patient who underwent diagnostic surgery in which some eggs were removed; when
asked if she would donate her extra eggs, the woman specifically declined to do so). The
recipients, on the other hand, believed that the eggs came from legitimate donors.
Michelle Nicolosi & Susan Kelleher, Test Finds Genetic Mother of Boy Born in Egg
Swap, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Feb. 20, 1998, atAl, availablein 1998 WL 2614213.

263. Karen T. Rogers, Embryo Theft: The MisappropriationofHuman Eggs at an
Irvine FertilityClinic Has Raised a Host ofNew Legal Concernsfor Infertile Couples
Using New Reproductive Technologies, 26 Sw. U. L. REv. 1133, 1147 (1997) ("If the
recipients are indeed without fault in causing the embryo misuse, they arguably have a
superior claim under this [intent] analysis as they intended to bring about the birth of this
particular child whereas the donors' intent had not yet fully manifested.").
264. Id.
265. Id.
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absence of her consent shows that the genetic provider has not waived her
constitutionally protected parental rights, as discussed in the following section.

6. The Constitutional Right to Procreate and Parent
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the right to procreate
and the right to care for one's offspring as among the liberty interests protected
by the Constitution. It is unclear, however, who holds these rights when a child

has two biological mothers, as in the assisted reproductive technology cases, and
how far these rights extend.
"The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart"
of the cluster of privacy rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.266 Thus, more than a half century ago, the Supreme
Court struck down a state law requiring sterilization of habitual criminals, stating
that "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race., 267 The Court has reaffirmed this concept in subsequent
decisions concerning an individual's right to avoid procreation, i.e, upholding
the right to use birth control products by married 268 and single persons 269 and the
right to terminate a pregnancy through abortion.270
Closely allied to the right to procreate is the right to parent, the right to "the
companionship, care, custody, and management" of a child after birth.27' The

266. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
267. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (decided on equal protection
grounds). In an earlier decision, the Court upheld a Virginia law providing for
sterilization of "mental defectives." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (finding that
sterilization was justified as a means of promoting the welfare of both the mental patient
and society). Buck has never been explicitly overruled, but the Court's subsequent ruling
in Skinner suggests that compulsory sterilization laws are unconstitutional unless the
state shows a compelling governmental interest and that its law is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.
268. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that state's law
prohibiting the use of contraceptives an unconstitutional infringement on the right of
marital privacy).
269. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (striking down a state law
prohibiting sale of contraceptives to unmarried persons, the court observed that "[i]f the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,married or single, to be
free of unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child") (emphasis added); see also
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating state law prohibiting
sale of contraceptives to minors).
270. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (striking down Texas criminal
abortion statute, the Court concluded that the "right of privacy... is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy").
271. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). "The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
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Supreme Court has emphasized on several occasions that these rights and
responsibilities "reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
'
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."272
273
Thus, as discussed in greater detail in Section I above, the Court has
recognized that a biological parent has a constitutionally protected interest in his
relationship with his offspring that must be accorded due respect in parentage
disputes, adoptions, and dependency proceedings.
The Supreme Court has not yet faced the issue of whether procreational and
parental rights exist when a child is produced with the assistance of reproductive
technology. State courts, however, have recognized that the right to procreate
is implicated in disputes concerning the disposition of genetic material such as
frozen sperm and embryos.274 Because genetic material has the potential to
create human life and, therefore, affect the gamete provider's procreational
status, courts have held that gamete providers have primary decision-making
power as to whether the genetic materials are used or destroyed.275

with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." Pierce v.
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). These "'additional obligations' . . . include
the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491

U.S. 110, 118-19 (1989). The court in Micheal H. cites to a California statute which
identifies rights of a custodial parent as including:
[T]he child's care; the right to the child's services and earnings; the right to
direct the child's activities; the right to make decisions regarding the control,
education, and health of the child; and the right, as well as the duty, to prepare

the child for additional obligations, which includes the teaching of moral
standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.
Id. at 118-19. Some commentators have suggested that the right to be a parent is
included within the right to procreate because "the procreative right is virtually empty
unless it ensures progenitors the right to acquire parental rights in the child." Hill, supra
note 19, at 367-68. But see In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253-54 (N.J. 1988) ("The
custody, care, companionship, and nurturing that follow birth are not parts of the right
to procreation; they are rights that may also be constitutionally protected, but that involve
many considerations other than the right of procreation.").
272. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); see also Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843 (1977)
(quoting Prince); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (quoting Prince).
273. See supra notes 33-56 and accompanying text.
274. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Davis
v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
275. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602 (holding that the right to procreate gives gamete
providers the right to decide whether preembryos may be used or destroyed because this
decision impacts upon the gamete provider's individual reproductive status); Hecht, 20
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283 (citing Davis's procreation analysis to recognize that a sperm donor
had decision-making interest regarding disposition of the sperm after his death).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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State courts also have recognized these rights in parentage disputes over
children born through reproductive technology.27 6 There is room for debate on
this issue, however, under the Supreme Court's analysis in the Michael H.
parental rights case.277 As explained above, four justices found, and one
assumed, that an unwed father had a constitutionally protected right to establish
a relationship with his biological offspring. 8 But the four justices who joined
the plurality opinion concluded that no such right existed in that case because the
law has not traditionally protected the interests of an unwed male who fathers a
child through an extramarital affair with a married woman.279
The plurality acknowledged the Supreme Court precedents which had
recognized that an unwed father could establish a liberty interest by
demonstrating a biological connection with the child as well as an established
parental relationship or acceptance of parental responsibilities. 2" But the
plurality qualified the holdings of those cases, stating that a constitutionally
protected liberty interest does not rest on those two factors alone "but upon the
historic respect ... traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within
the unitary family... 'Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' 28' The plurality stated that society
has not traditionally protected a parental claim from someone in Michael H's
position.282 "[T]o the contrary, our traditions have
protected the marital family
283
... against the sort of claim Michael asserts."

276. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 786 (Cal.) ("To the extent that tradition
has a bearing on the present case, we believe it supports the claim of the couple who
exercise their right to procreate in order to form a family of their own, albeit through
novel medical procedures."), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993); Baby M, 537 A.2d at
1253 (stating that right to procreate is "the right to have natural children, whether through
sexual intercourse or artificial insemination"); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 766
(Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994) (stating that the decision to allow "implantation of... egg and
sperm with the understanding that the surrogate will raise the resulting child also
involves the surrendering of parental rights").
277. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), discussed supra notes 48-57
and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
279. Id.
280. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 123 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
and its progeny, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)).
281. Id. at 123-24 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977));
see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("The history and culture of
Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and
upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.").
282. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124.
283. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
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Under this restrictive view, procreation through reproductive technology
arguably is not constitutionally protected because such technology has only
recently emerged and, therefore, is not part of our history or tradition. The
dissenting justices in MichaelH., however, suggested the Court's prior opinions
had not "looked to tradition with such specificity" in defining liberty interests.2 4
"Surely the use of contraceptives by unmarried couples, or even by married
couples,.., and even the right to raise one's natural but illegitimate children,
our society,' at the time of their
were not 'interest[s] traditionally
285 protected by
consideration by this Court."
The trial court in Baby Mtook this approach, declining to consider whether
reproduction by artificial insemination and the use of surrogates was a
historically protected method of reproduction. Instead, the court took a broader
focus, finding that there is a long tradition of protecting the right to reproduce.8 6
"[I]f one has a right to procreate coitally, then one has the right to reproduce
non-coitally. If it is the reproduction that is protected, then the means of
reproduction are also to be protected. ' 287 Accordingly, there are valid reasons
to find that assisted reproduction falls within the constitutionally protected rights
to procreate and parent.288
Assuming that a constitutional right to procreate or parent exists with
respect to modem technology, it is unclear who holds such rights when one
woman provides the genetic material that another woman gestates to bear a
child. The Supreme Court precedents have linked parental rights to the
"biological connection" between an unwed father and his child, but who is a

mother when the reproductive function is shared by two
child's "biological"
289
women?

284. Id. at 139.
285. Id. (citations omitted).
286. In re Baby M.,525 A.2d 1128, 1164 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), affd in
partand rev'd in part,537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
287. Id. (holding that the use of surrogates was a protected means of procreation).
288. This is not to say that the state can never restrict a person's right to procreate
or parent. It simply means that the state must meet a strict scrutiny analysis in adopting
such restrictions because the state is treading on fundamental rights. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has recognized that states may restrict parental rights "if it appears that
parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for
significant social burdens." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972); see also
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating that "the state as parens
patriaemay restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or
prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other ways").
289. The Supreme Court's cases have not defined the term "biological," but the
word is typically defined as "relating to biology or to life and living things: belonging
to or characteristic of the processes of life." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
218 (1981). "Biology" is defined as "a branch of knowledge that deals with living
organisms and vital processes ...commonly being restricted to consideration of
to the origin, development, structure, functions, and
wide application
principlesbyof
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The Supreme Court's fathers' rights cases implicitly acknowledge that a
genetic provider has the requisite biological connection to a child because these
cases have recognized a parental right in biological fathers, whose sole function
290
in many cases is to provide the genetic seed from which the child is produced.
As a matter of equal protection, then, a state that allows biological fathers to
establish parentage through genetic testing arguably must afford that same right
to genetic mothers.291
The rights of a gestational mother are less clear. While society has a long
tradition of recognizing the woman who gave birth as the child's natural
mother,292 it is unclear whether maternal status was based upon her gestational
role, or because "giving birth was293synonymous with providing the genetic
makeup of the child that was born."
The Johnson court attempted to resolve these competing claims through its
intent test, declaring the legal mother to be the one who intended to procreate for
purposes of raising the child.2 94 The surrogate mother, therefore, "is not
exercising her own right to make procreative choices; she is agreeing to provide
a necessary and profoundly important service without (by definition) any
expectation that she will raise the resulting child as her own."2'9 5 Conversely,
when the gestational mother bears a child from a donor's egg, the gestational
mother is exercising the right to procreate while the genetic donor is not.
This view has some merit, particularly in light of the Supreme Court cases
stating that a "biological connection" alone does not establish parental rights in

distribution of living matter as represented by plants and animals and to the generally
recurrent phenomena of life, growth, and reproduction. . . ." Id. Under this definition,
both the genetic and gestational mothers would seem to qualify as "biological" parents
because both genetic material and gestation are essential to human reproduction.
290. Some commentators have criticized this view as patriarchal. "The reason why
genes are so highly valued, some claim, is because men's contribution to procreation is
entirely genetic and, therefore, men can identify with a woman who asserts a parentalrights claim based on genetics." Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg
Donation: Unscramblingthe Conundrum ofLegal Maternity, 80 IowA L. REv. 265, 275

(1995); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 244, at 40-45 ("When we accept the patriarchal
valuing of the seed, there is no doubt-the real mother, like the real father, is the genetic
parent.").
291. See Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (declaring
state surrogacy statute unconstitutional because it automatically granted the surrogate the
status of legal mother and denied genetic mother the opportunity to prove maternity); see
also Hofheimer, supra note 238, at 596 ("States that have granted parental rights to the
biological fathers of surrogacy children will be constrained by the Equal Protection
Clause to grant genetic-intended mothers equal rights.").

292. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
293. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994); see also supra
note 126 and accompanying text.
294. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993).
295. Id. at 787.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
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an unwed father. 96 Thus, a biological father must establish something more-an
acceptance of responsibility and/or the establishment of a parental
relationship-which is exactly what California's intent test requires. Just as an
unwed father accepts responsibility for the child after birth, intending parents in
fact accept responsibility prior to conception. This test is inconclusive, however,
when both mothers possess the requisite intent, as is the case when one woman
mistakenly gestates another woman's genetic material without the latter's
consent.297
The Belsito court took a different approach to procreational rights,
298
suggesting that only genetic parents have procreational or parentage rights,
because procreation is "the replication of the unique genes of an
individual.
,,299 Thus, a gestational mother cannot be considered the child's
natural parent because "she has not contributed to the genetics of the child, and
the genetic parent or parents have not waived their rights .. . ."' This definition
seems inappropriately narrow because it ignores the vital role that a gestational
mother performs in the procreation process.
Moreover, even if a gestational mother does not qualify under a strict
definition of biological parent, the Supreme Court has stated that "biological
relationships are not [the] exclusive determination of the existence of a
family. '30 1 Rather, "the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals
involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive
from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in "promot(ing)
a way of life' through the instruction of children, as well as from the fact of
blood relationship. 302 A gestational mother certainly fits this definition given
her role in the reproductive effort. Indeed, in his dissent in the Stanley case,
Chief Justice Burger suggested that a state would be "fully justified in
concluding, on the basis of common human experience, that the biological role
of the mother in carrying and nursing an infant creates stronger bonds between
her and the30 3child than the bonds resulting from the male's often casual
encounter."
Assuming that the Court would recognize a constitutionally protected
parental right outside of blood relations, however, the parameters of such a right
are unclear. In ruling on a claim brought by foster parents, the Court found that
some foster family relationships fit this definition, but the Court suggested that
296. See supra notes 33-56 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
298. Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 766.
299. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 766 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994).
300. Id.
301. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 843 (1977).
302. Id. at 844 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972))
(footnote omitted).
303.byStanley
v. Illinois,
405 U.S.
645, of
665Law
(1972)
(Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
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a foster parent's interest in continuing this relationship deserved at best only
limited constitutional protection." As the Court explained, a foster care
relationship is established as a matter of contract with the state and, therefore, is
subject to the contract terms concerning the state's right to remove the children
from foster care and return them to their natural parents.3 5 The Court also noted
that recognizing a constitutional right in the foster parents would derogate the
constitutional rights of the natural parents.3" Accordingly, the Court held that
the foster family's interest must be "substantially attenuated where the proposed
30 7
removal from the foster family is to return the child to his natural parents.
A similar argument could be advanced against recognizing parental rights
in a gestational mother because to do so would conflict with the constitutional
rights of the genetic mother. On the other hand, one could argue that
recognizing rights in the gestational mother is analogous to recognizing
simultaneous parental rights in fathers and mothers. In the latter situation, both
parties play an indispensable role in producing the genetic seed from which a
child is born. The gestational mother, likewise, plays an indispensable role in
the child's development during pregnancy. Accordingly, just as courts have
traditionally recognized parental rights in both fathers and mothers, the law
should now recognize the parental rights of dual mothers.
This conclusion is consistent with an equal protection analysis. Assuming
that procreation through modem technology is constitutionally protected, a
gestational mother obviously would be exercising procreational rights if she
becomes pregnant through in vitro fertilization using a donor's eggs. It would
be purely arbitrary to say that this same woman could not establish procreational
rights if she has mistakenly used another woman's eggs without consent.0 8

304. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844. In Smith, the Court suggested:
[W]here a child has been placed in foster care as an infant, has never known
his natural parents, and has remained continuously for several years in the
care of the same foster parents, it is natural that the foster family should hold
the same place in the emotional life of the foster child, and fulfill the same
socializing functions, as a natural family.
Id.
305. Id. at 845.
306. Id. at 846. As the Court explained:
It is one thing to say that individuals may acquire a liberty interest against
arbitrary governmental interference in the family-like associations into which
they have freely entered, even in the absence of biological connection or
state-law recognition of the relationship. It is quite another to say that one
may acquire such an interest in the face of another's constitutionally
recognized liberty interest that derives from blood relationship, state-law
sanction, and basic human right an interest the foster parent has recognized
by contract from the outset.
Id.
307. Id. at 847.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
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In sum, both women have equally persuasive constitutional claims and, to
the extent that both are innocent victims of unfortunate circumstances, it would
be difficult to justify a parentage decision looking solely at the claim from the
parents' perspective. Moreover, deciding these claims based solely upon the
interests of these adults ignores an equally innocent, but considerably more
vulnerable, party-the child. The parentage determination, therefore, should not
turn solely on parental rights, but instead should also consider the best interests
of the child.
B. Best Interests of the Child
The common law's parentage rules were based upon the traditional belief
that being with one's "natural" parents was in the child's best interests because
"natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children." 3" When a child is conceived through natural intercourse, this
traditional belief leads to a bright-line test awarding parentage to the child's
biological parents. When a child has two "biological" mothers, however, both
women share a natural bond of affection with the child. Thus, some other means
must be devised to determine how the child's best interests can be served.
Some have argued for a bright-line test, contending that placement with the
gestational mother is always in the child's best interest or, conversely, that the
child's interests are always best served by being with the genetic mother. Others
have argued for a multi-factor best interests analysis like that used in custody
disputes between parents in the divorce setting. As discussed more fully below,
each position has its strengths and weaknesses. Thus, this Article concludes that
the preferable approach lies somewhere between the two extremes.

1. A Bright-Line Test Favoring Genetics or Gestation
Adoption of a categorical or bright-line test has considerable appeal because
it allows parentage to be determined with certainty from the moment of a child's
birth. A multi-factor test, on the other hand, would hold parental status in limbo
until a judicial officer could weigh the factors and render a determination. In
terms of family stability, therefore, a bright-line test would be preferable, but the
test is vulnerable to criticisms on other fronts.

establish parental rights in both situations. But the same can be said of the genetic
mother who has exercised her procreational right by undergoing fertility treatments that
produced the frozen eggs or embryos that were wrongfully implanted in the gestational

mother.
309. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
Published
by University
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* 447).of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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First, there is considerable disagreement as to which mother should prevail
under a bright-line test. The arguments generally fall into a "nature" versus
"nurture" debate: those who favor the genetic mother focus on the bonds of
nature, i.e., the concept of genetic identity, while those who favor the gestational
mother focus primarily on the social bonding that occurs between the child and
mother during pre-natal and post-natal nurturing.
A child's genetic identity obviously is based upon the genetic code received
from the egg and sperm providers. Thus, the genetic mother shares half of the
genes that dictate the child's physical attributes, including a predisposition to
certain medical conditions, and perhaps certain mental or psychological
attributes as well.310 Several courts have found that this link is a powerful factor
in the child-parent relationship because "[h]eredity can provide a basis of
connection between two individuals for the duration of their liveso ''31" and "[t]he
genetic parent can guide the child from experience through the strengths and
312
weaknesses of a common ancestry of genetic traits."
The importance of this genetic identity is illustrated by the desire of some
adopted children to find their biological parents or separated siblings.3 3 But, the
impact of separating a child from a genetic parent is unclear. Some
commentators have suggested that genetics is of "compelling importance" to an
individual's sense of identity while the gestational mother plays only a minor
role in developing the child's identity.314 "Although the child may be curious
about the woman who carried and gave birth to her, she can think of her much
in the same way as a child raised in infancy by a hired nanny might think of the
nanny., 31 5 Other commentators have argued the converse. In their view, "[a]
child may experience a natural curiosity regarding her parentage and biological

310. Expert testimony in a California surrogacy case showed that:
[T]he whole process of human development is "set in motion by the genes."
There is not a single organic system of the human body not influenced by an
individual's underlying genetic makeup. Genes determine the way
physiological components of the human body, such as the heart, liver, or
blood vessels operate. Also, . .. it is now thought that genes influence tastes,
preferences, personality styles, manners of speech and mannerisms.
Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369,380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), ajfdsub nom. Johnson
v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993). Some researchers,
however, have criticized the claim that genetics can affect human behavior. See, e.g.,
Schiff, supra note 290, at 276 n.55 (citing RUTH HUBBARD & ELIJAH WALD, EXPLODING
THE GENE MYTH (1993)).

311. Anna J., 286 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
312. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 766 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994).
313. RAE, supra note 215, at 83 (noting that this phenomenon also has been
observed in children bom through artificial insemination in which donor sperm was
used).
314. Hofheimer, supra note 238, at 602.
315. Id. at 609.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
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legacy,"3 6 but separation from the genetic parent
317 does not necessarily translate
into a loss of the child's sense of self-identity.
The genetic connection often has great significance from the mothers'
perspective as well as from that of the child. In fact, it is the desire for genetic
reproduction that drives many women to seek fertility treatment rather than to
adopt a child. Thus, regardless of whether a gestational mother has subsequently
bonded with the non-genetically related child she has carried, her initial conduct
shows that she, too, considered genetics to be a paramount factor. That would
not be the case, however, with women who have chosen fertility treatments for
other reasons, such as to avoid long waiting lists at adoption agencies or because
they desire the experience of pregnancy and prenatal bonding, which they could
not obtain through adoption.
Yet, genetics is not the only factor that determines a child's identity. A
developing fetus obviously depends entirely upon the gestational mother for
sustenance and protection during the pregnancy3"' and continues to use the
mother's blood, nutrients, and antibodies for some time after birth.319 More than
just a human incubator, however, the gestational mother makes a significant
well. 320
contribution to the child's emotional and psychological development as
Indeed, a number of studies support the view that an unborn child's personality
begins to develop in the womb and, therefore, "the woman who carries the child
plays a formative role in either assisting or hindering that development. 3 2'
It is clear, therefore, that a gestational mother and child begin to develop a
significant bond during pregnancy, and this bond continues to strengthen after

birth. What is less clear is the harm that the child will suffer if this bond is
discontinued after birth. A number of studies have shown the importance of
316. Hill, supra note 19, at 404; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 245, at 40
(describing genetic relations as a "source of pleasure" but not the determining factor of
parentage).
317. Hill, supranote 19, at 404 (arguing that the claim linking genetics to selfidentity "is predicated upon a troublesome view of personal identity, which implies that
every adopted child is hopelessly insecure and devoid of self-respect. It appears to
confuse the psychological notion of self-identity with the relatively more superficial
knowledge of one's biological legacy.").

318. Schiff, supranote 290, at 274 ("[T]he nine-month gestational period involves
a dynamic and intense process, during which the mother's body constantly supplies
essential nutrients, eliminates toxins, and provides warmth and protection to the

developing fetus.").
319. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 378 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd sub
nom. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993).
320. RAE, supranote 215, at 87-91.

321. Id. at 91. Rae cites a number of scientific studies, including: B.R.H. Van den
Bergh's studies linking the emotions of the mother during pregnancy to the child's

temperament after birth; studies of the emotional impact on children bom to
schizophrenic women; and studies linking a woman's attitude toward the child during

Id. at 89-90.
child at birth.
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developing secure emotional ties between a child and at least one parent figure
early in childhood.322 But one commentator suggests that there is no evidence
that the child must form this relationship with the gestational mother.323 To the
contrary, research indicates that "the younger the child, the shorter the period
required to completely break his emotional ties to his natural parents." 324 In fact,
with infants, it may take "as little as an hour to form a new bond with another
person., 325 The bonding factor, therefore, may have diminished importance in
the case of a newborn or infant.326 With older children, however, some
commentators have suggested that the "familial relationship" should be accorded
considerable weight because "[t]his social relationship is much more important,
to the child at least, than a biological relationship .... , 32 7
In short, strong arguments exist on both sides of the issue, leading some
commentators to suggest that there is "no persuasive basis for a categorical
preference for either a gestational or genetic contributor to receive exclusive
recognition as 'mother.' ' 328 Moreover, even if agreement could be reached on
a categorical norm, the bright-line test is subject to a second criticism that applies
to such tests in general: the failure to provide flexibility for cases that fall
outside the norm. In other words, application of a categorical test might
automatically award parentage to the gestational mother without considering
whether, under the particular circumstances of a case, the child's interests would

322. Hill, supra note 19, at 402-03. These studies have shown, for example, that:
[I]nfants failing to form a bond with any adult are likely to lack the
ability to form deep and enduring relationships later in life[,...
infants who are placed for adoption after nine months of age have
difficulties with a variety of "socioemotional" matters, including
establishing certain kinds of relationships with others... [and] the
quality of attachment in infancy may affect the IQ of the child and
the development of the child's sense of self-identity, thereby

affecting the child's ability to cope with various environments
including schools.
Hill, supra note 19, at 402.
323. Hill, supranote 19, at 403.
324. Stephanie Hawkins Smith, Note, Psychological Parents vs. Biological
Parents: The Courts' Response to New Directionsin Child Custody DisputeResolution,
17 J. FAM. L. 545, 546 (1979).
325. Hill, supra note 19, at 403 (citing THOMAS R. VERNAY & JOHN KELLY, THE
148 (1981)).
326. William P. Hoffman, Jr., Recent Developments, California'sTangled Web:
Blood Tests and the Conclusive Presumption ofLegitimacy, 20 STAN. L. REv. 754, 761
SECRET LIFE OF THE UNBORN CHILD

(1968) (suggesting that "[i]n the case of a young child the most palpable relation that
anyone has to the child is a biological relationship").
327. Id.
328. Shultz, supra note 134, at 332; see also Schiff, supra note 290, at 277, 287

(granting legal maternal status to either of them on the basis of biological connection is
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
difficult
to justify).
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be better served by the genetic mother. It is these individualized considerations
that are highlighted in the analysis discussed below.

2. Individualized Assessments Using a Multi-Factor Test
There is strong precedent for using a multi-factor analysis to decide

between competing parental claims. The test has long been used by family law
courts to determine who should have control and care of a child as between a
husband and wife upon divorce or between a biological mother and father who
have never married. The goal of the best interests test is not "adjudicating rights
in the children, as if they were chattels, but rather... making the best disposition
' Thus, "the state's interest in the
possible for the welfare of the children."329

growth and development of healthy and productive and stable citizens, as well
as the child's own interest in being protected, are more important than the rights
'
or needs of the parents."33
Some states provide only very generalized guidelines for their best interests
331

tests, thereby giving courts broad discretion in making custody determinations.
Other states set forth specific factors that the court should consider in making its
decision.332 Thus, multi-factor tests range from the simple five-point analysis of

329. 2 JOHN P. McCAHEY ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY & VISITATION LAW AND PRAC.
§ 10.01[2][b] (1998) (quoting May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 541 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting)). The distinction between parental rights and a child's welfare is significant
because under the parental rights doctrine, a fit parent "has a right to the custody, care,
and companionship of his or her child even if the best interests of the child would be
better served by being placed with a third party." Hill, supra note 19, at 363. The best
interests analysis is used, however, when a court is determining who should get custody
as between two fit, legal parents.
330. 2 JOHN P. MCCAHEY ET AL., supra note 329, § 10.01 [2][a].
331. 2 JOHN P. MCCAHEY ET AL., supra note 329, § 10.06[2][b][iii] (stating that
"[a]pproximately one-third of the states do not enumerate specific factors in their custody

statutes").
2 JOHN P. MCCAHEY
ETSchool
AL., supra
note Scholarship
329, § 10.06[2][i],
[ii]. 1999
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the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act33 to statutes listing more than a dozen

enumerated factors.334
Most of these factors could be applied to determine custody in cases
involving a choice between two mothers. The ultimate goal, of course, is to
identify the parent or parents best able "to nurture the child physically and
psychologically" and to provide "stability and continuity. '3
Thus,
considerations that may differentiate between two mothers would include marital
status and stability,3

36

the existence of siblings (especially if genetically related

to the child in question),337 the extent to which the child has bonded with the
333. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987). The Act
provides, in pertinent part:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest
of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the
child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does
not affect his relationship to the child.
Id.
334. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 14-10-124 (1.5) (West 1997) (listing 13
factors to consider). Two commentators who surveyed investigative reports and court
orders in contested custody cases across the country have compiled a list of 10 major
factors that courts have considered, with 43 subfactors. 2 JOHN P. MCCAHEY ET AL.,

supra note 329, § 10.06[2][b][v] (citing Jessica Pearson & Maria A. Luchesi Ring,
JudicialDecision-Makingin Contested Custody Cases,21 J. FAM. L. 703, 709 (1983)).
335. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 800 (Cal.) (Kennard, J., dissenting), cert.

denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993).
336. Courts typically place great value on promoting family stability, as illustrated
by the discussion above concerning the presumption of paternity in the husband of a
married woman. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. As a corollary philosophy,
courts tend to honor a cultural preference for the conventional nuclear family. One
commentator stated:
The nuclear family is the preferred, ifnot practiced, form of household among
the educated middle class people whose opinions heavily impact legal
decision-making. A household which is based on marriage is typically
assumed to be more stable, emotionally consistent, and supportive than other
types of households. Since children need stable, emotionally consistent and
supportive homes, the thinking goes, it seems natural that they should be
raised in nuclear families. Any other option is second best.
Kandel, supra note 214, at 185.
337. Thus, a court might consider the psychological benefits of being raised with
other children as opposed to being an only child. To the extent that the siblings are
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
genetically
related to the child, this factor also addresses the psychological concerns of
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gestational mother,338 the capacity to assume the role of primary caretaker,339 and
the ability to accept and foster a continuing relationship between the child and
the non-custodial parent(s).
The chief benefit of a multi-factor test is its flexibility, i.e., its ability to
accommodate the individualized circumstances of each particular case. 340 The
test also addresses many of the public policy concerns underlying state laws
regarding adoptions and termination of parental rights. 34 1 By having a court
make the custody determination, the law would protect and accommodate the
parental rights of the parties, rather than unilaterally denying parental status on
the basis of a categorical test. At the same time, a multi-factor test would protect
the child's interest by ensuring placement in the care of competent and caring
parents.
-The tradeoff, however, is a lack of certainty because parental status remains
in limbo until ajudicial determination can be made. In addition, the test itself
offers courts very little guidance about the relative importance of each factor.
Thus, it is unclear whether the court should give all of the factors equal weight
and declare a winner based upon who has the most factors in her favor, or
whether the court should give some factors more weight than others.
3. Between the Two Extremes-A Modified Best Interests Test
From a theoretical perspective, the multi-factor best interests test appears
to offer a fair and impartial method of determining parentage. Instead of
denigrating the value of one category of mothers while elevating the importance
of the other, the multi-factor test starts from the premise that genetic and
gestational mothers as a class have equal significance in a child's life. The test
genetic identity. See supra notes 310-17 and accompanying text.
338. As explained above, this factor grows in significance with the age of the child.
See supra notes 322-27 and accompanying text.
339. This factor would consider which parent can make the commitment of time,
energy, and emotional support required for good parenting. A court might consider, for
example, whether both spouses work outside the home, requiring someone else to
provide extensive child care. But this factor, like the best interests test itself, is not
susceptible to a bright-line test. In some cases, a stay-at-home mother is preferable to
placing the child in someone else's care while the parent or parents are working. But, on
the other hand, a high-quality day care environment can give children a significant
advantage over their peers by helping to build their social skills as well as giving them
a jump on their formal education. Thus, the court should consider the specific
circumstances of each case before deciding how the child's best interests would be
served.
340. Although some commentators have criticized the test as being too
"indeterminate" or "amorphous," the flexibility of the test allows judges to tailor a
decision to the particular circumstances of a given case and to reflect changing social

values. 2 JOHN P. MCCAHEY ET AL., supra note 329, § 10.06[2][a].
341. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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then attempts to determine on an individualized basis which parent would better
serve the child's interests in a particular case.
As a practical matter, however, results would be skewed in favor of the
gestational mother. Whether expressly prioritized in a statute or left to the
judge's discretion, one of the most critical factors in the best interests test is the
length of time that a child has bonded with a parent. In the case of switched
genetic material, that parent will always be the gestational mother because she
would have possession of the child at birth and retain control under the status
quo until a different determination can be made by a court.342 Given the delays
inherent in the judicial system, it is likely to be a year or more before that
determination can be made. Thus, the best interests analysis is almost always
going to favor the gestational mother because only the most compelling
circumstances are likely to overcome the child's need to continue the significant
bond that develops while the case is being litigated.
A court could mitigate this effect to some extent by providing for visitation
or other contact by the genetic mother or parents while the case is pending. But
this limited contact still would not allow the genetic mother to establish the type
of bond that the gestational mother would have as a result of her day-to-day
nurturing of the child.
Under these circumstances, adoption of a bright-line test awarding
parentage to the gestational mother would appear to be the more prudent course.
It would allow parentage to be determined with certainty immediately upon the
child's birth without pursuing a lengthy judicial process that, in all likelihood,
will end up with the same result. Yet, that test is still troubling because it fails
to recognize that in some cases, the child's best interests will be served by
placement with the genetic mother notwithstanding the length of time that the
child has been with the gestational mother.
One way to accommodate all of these interests is to adopt a modified best
interests analysis which recognizes a presumption in favor of the gestational
mother, but allows the courts to place the child with the genetic mother if there
are circumstances suggesting that such placement is in the child's best interests
regardless of the bond the child has developed with the gestational mother.
Thus, a genetic mother might prevail, for example, if the gestational mother is
shown to have a drug addiction, pending criminal charges requiring
incarceration, or other proven inability to care for the child. Other arguments
could be made that placement with the genetic mother is preferable because the
child shares genetic characteristics such as ethnicity or other physical or mental
attributes with the genetic mother, suggesting that the child could better relate
to and receive emotional support from the genetic mother in coping with these

342. In fact, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that in a dispute between a

surrogate and a biological father, "only in the most unusual case should the child be
taken from its mother before the dispute is finally determined by the court on its merits."
Inhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/1
re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1261 (N.J. 1988).
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attributes. In the absence of such factors, however, the child would remain with
the gestational mother.
There is room for debate as to how this analysis should be used in parentage

determinations. The best interests test historically has been used to determine
how to divide care and custody as between a child's two legal parents. Thus, it
comes into play only after a court has determined the identity of the legal parents
and assumes that both parents should have some parental role, although one may
be subordinate to the other. One judge has suggested, however, that the test be
moved up in the process when there are competing claims for maternity by a
gestational and genetic mother.343 In this case, the test would be used to
determine which of two potential mothers is entitled to parental status; the other
would have no rights whatsoever.
Use of the best interests test in this latter scenario is premised upon the
traditional belief, as discussed earlier, that a child can have only one natural
mother and one father.3" This belief was once well-grounded in biological fact,
of course, but it is out of step with reality now that reproductive technology has
made it possible for a child to have two biological mothers. Yet, courts have
adamantly refused to recognize both women as parents.345
This reluctance may be explained by a desire to preserve the conventional
norm of the nuclear family,346 as well as concern about the practical
consequences of recognizing two women as legal parents, i.e., the difficulties of
dividing custody of the child between two mothers. 347 This situation is not
significantly different, however, from the traditional division of custody between
a legal mother and a legal father upon divorce. It simply means that a court
potentially may have parental claims from three parties-two biological mothers
and the biological father-rather than the typical claim involving one mother and
one father. In the vast majority of cases, however, the father will be the spouse
of one of the mothers. As a result, the court faces a straightforward question of

343. See supranotes 159-67 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
346. Kandel, supra note 214, at 168 (describing the concept of the nuclear family
as a "fundamental assumption[]" that "act[s] almost unconsciously to powerfully direct
thought processes and can inhibit creativity in legal decision-making") (citing Janet L.
Dolgin, Just a Gene: JudicialAssumptions About Parenthood,40 UCLA L. REv. 637,

640-41 (1993)); see also Schiff, supra note 290, at 287 (noting that recognition of dual
mothers would depend upon the "willingness of the legal system to depart from the
traditional definition of family"); Shultz, supra note 134, at 332 (suggesting that the child

should have two biological mothers, but noting that the concept "is unconventional, and
therefore unlikely to be imposed").
347. Shultz, supra note 134, at 332 ("[T]he practical fact that both women would

have to be willing to cooperate in a plan of access to the child means that such an
arrangement would be difficult if imposed rather than chosen.").
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determining how much time the child will spend between two households, just
as in the typical divorce case, or a surrogacy situation like the Baby M case. 4
Obviously, a court will want to provide as much stability and normalcy for
the child as possible, which is true whether the custody dispute is between a
mother and father or between two mothers.349 But with a wide range of custody
and visitation options how available,35 the court should be able to fashion an
arrangement that protects the child while still acknowledging the interests of all
parents. In some cases, for example, the circumstances may permit a shared
custody arrangement or placement of the child in the legal custody of one mother
with visitation for the other. In other cases, it may be advisable to suspend one
parent's visitation rights, limiting the contact to communication between only the
custodial and non-custodial parents until the child reaches an appropriate age to
understand the circumstances of his or her birth and is able to decide for himself
or herself whether contact with the other parent would be desirable.
One could argue that the latter arrangement would be tantamount to
terminating the non-custodial party's parental rights. 351 But such an order would
be constitutionally permissible if required to protect the best interests of the
child. 352 Moreover, this process is more analytically honest-and perhaps more

348. Cases could arise in which the biological father is not married to either
mother, such as when donor sperm is used without the donor's consent or waiver of
parental rights. This would pose a more complicated scenario, requiring a court to divide
a child's time between three households (that of the genetic mother, gestational mother,
and genetic father). But this is only incrementally more difficult than dividing custody
and visitation among two households.
349. Shultz, supra note 134, at 332 n.100 (discussing the unworkability ofjoint
custody arrangements between mothers and fathers in divorce cases).
350. In earlier years, courts typically awarded sole legal custody to only one parent,
giving the other limited visitation rights. 2 JOHN P. MCCAHEY

ET AL.,

supra note 329,

§ 10.03[3][c][ii] (defining sole custody as placing primary decision-making authority and
control in one parent with whom the child usually resides). But a much wider variety of
custody arrangements is now widely used, including "joint or shared custody" and
"alternating, rotating, or shifting custody." 2 JOHN P. MCCAHEY ET AL., supra note 329,

§ 10.03[3]. Although the latter types ofarrangements were once disfavored because they
were perceived as causing too much instability for the child, they have gained more
widespread acceptance in recent years. 2 JOHN P. MCCAHEY ET AL., supra note 329, §

10.03[3[c][vi]. The courts, therefore, have the ability to tailor custody decisions to the
individualized needs of a particular case.
351. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1255 (N.J. 1988) ("It seems obvious to us

that since custody and visitation encompass practically all of what we call 'parental
rights,' a total denial of both would be the equivalent of termination of parental rights.").
352. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (recognizing that an unwed
father's interest in the "companionship, care, custody, and management" of his children
is "cognizable and substantial," but holding that the state did not infringe upon this right
by applying a "best interests of the child" standard to the father's attempt to block the
child's
adoption).
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psychologically palatable to the woman whose parental rights are curtailed
because it recognizes that this person is a parent, but concludes that she must be
deprived of most of the benefits of parenthood in order to protect the best
interests of the child.353
The only real obstacle to dual motherhood, then, is society's reluctance to
accept the new facts of nature as supplemented by modem technology. The
courts have avoided facing this reality in surrogacy cases by fashioning rules,
such as the intent test, that would grant parental status to only one biological
mother, but deny it to the other. But for the reasons discussed above, these rules
are unworkable in the context of children born from misdelivered or stolen
genetic material. Thus, rather than trying to arbitrarily choose between the
genetic and gestational mother, it would make more sense to treat them equally
and determine that they are both parents. Their claims can then be resolved as
a matter of custody, as the law historically has done when there is a dispute
between two parties who have equal parental rights.
C. The Special Case ofStolen Embryos
The preceding discussion has assumed good faith on the part of the
gestational mother, i.e., that she had no knowledge that she was gestating genetic
material without the permission of the genetic provider. A different case arises
if the gestational mother participates in the theft of the genetic material or
otherwise knows that she is the recipient of such material. In this latter case, the
law may seek to avoid rewarding the wrong and, therefore, refuse to declare
parental rights in the gestational mother. The better view, however, is to decide
the case under a best interests analysis.
Under traditional property law, a person who wrongfully obtains another's
property does not acquire title to that property, even if the wrongdoer
substantially enhances the value of the property through his or her labor and
materials.3 4 Thus, by analogy, a gestational mother who knowingly receives the
stolen genetic material of another woman arguably should be denied parental
rights in the child that develops from the genetic material even though the
gestational mother has expended considerable time, labor, and risk in nurturing
the fetus. A more modem approach, however, might find this rule too harsh,
particularly if the gestational mother's investment and the value of the end

353. One benefit the mother would retain as a result of her parental status is the
right to petition the court for a change of custody in the event that the custodial parent(s)
are not acting in the best interests of the child. As such, it addresses the concerns of
genetic parents like Junior Davis who feel an innate responsibility to ensure the wellbeing of their genetic offspring. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
354. Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 316 (1871); BROwN, supra note 211, §
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product are "out of all proportion" to the value of the genetic materials prior to
gestation. 5
Moreover, as noted above, property principles do not provide a perfect
analogue to parentage disputes. Thus, while public policy in property law
suggests that we not reward the wrongdoer, family law concepts would
recognize a competing-indeed, paramount-policy of protecting the best
interests of the child. The aim of making parties whole "should not be at the
expense of innocent parties.

'3

Mays357 case

The Twigg v.
provides a good example of these competing
policies. The Twiggs were seeking a judicial declaration that Kimberly Mays
was their biological daughter, having been switched shortly after birth with a
child born to another couple. Despite the Twiggs's highly publicized claims that
the other couple was intentionally involved in the swap and blood tests that
showed a 95% probability that the Twiggs were Kimberly's biological parents,
the Florida courts denied the Twiggs standing to pursue their claim. 358 In
reaching this decision, the appellate court acknowledged that natural parents
have certain presumptive rights of custody, but said those rights are not absolute.
Children are not property, but individuals whose needs and physical
and mental well-being find protection in the law. The cases dealing
with custody contests between a natural parent and a third party are
replete with declarations that the privilege of custody of the natural
parent must yield if such custody will be detrimental to the welfare of
the child.5 9
Accordingly, the appellate court remanded the case and directed the trial court
to determine whether there was any probability that the Twiggs would prevail
or, conversely, whether their request for relief would be denied because of the
probable detrimental effects on the child."6 On remand, the trial court concluded
that the Twiggs, by engaging in various types of inappropriate conduct,36' had
not shown substantial concern for the welfare of the child and, therefore, their
complaint was dismissed for lack of standing.362

355. BROWN, supra note 211, § 6.2 (suggesting that it is questionable whether the
traditional view would be followed by modem courts when the value of the resulting
product is "out of all proportion" to the value of the original materials).
356. Rogers, supra note 263, at 1151.
357. No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993); see
supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.

358. Twigg, 1993 WL 330624 at *2; Mays v. Twigg, 543 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).

359. Twigg, 543 So. 2d at 243.
360. Id.
361. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
362. Twigg, 1993 WL 330624 at *5-6.
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The Twigg case shows that a modified best interests test can be applied in
cases of stolen genetic material as well as in cases where the switch occurs from
a mistake. In the case of theft, however, the balance should tip in favor of the
genetic mother. Thus, if the gestational mother is shown to have participated in
the wrongdoing, the test would presume that custody should be given to the
genetic mother. The gestational mother would prevail only if she could
demonstrate that it would be in the child's best interests to remain with her
notwithstanding her involvement in the wrong, i.e., that the child would suffer
detrimental effects if removed from the gestational mother.
IV. RESOLVING PARENTAGE CLAIMS WITH A COMBINATION OF
INTENT + BEST INTERESTS
The discussion in Section III suggests that a two-part analysis should be
used to determine parentage when a child has two biological mothers as a result
of stolen or misdelivered genetic material. The first step of the analysis would
consider the intent of the parties, which would allow courts to legalize the
parentage expectations of the parties in cases in which there are no conflicting
claims to the child. The second step would use a modified best interests analysis
to resolve custody issues in the remaining cases in which both mothers have
satisfied the intent requirement. Application of this test is described below, with
suggestions of how to incorporate the standard into the Uniform Parentage Act

(UPA).
A. ExplanationandAnalysis of the Test
The first step of the intent + best interests analysis is to determine who has
the intent to parent the child. The law should start with the assumption, as in all
other parentage cases, that the woman who gives birth is the child's natural and
legal mother. Her intent to procreate and raise the child may be implied from her
participation in the in vitro fertilization process. Accordingly, in the absence of
a claim from a woman stating that she is the genetic mother, the gestational
mother's status would be exclusive and absolute.363
A genetic mother can establish parentage by proving her genetic link with
the child, that her genetic material was used without her consent, and that she has
not waived her parental rights. If the gestational mother disclaims intent to
parent the child after learning that another woman's genetic material was
implanted without the latter's consent, the genetic mother's status would be
exclusive and absolute. If, however, the gestational mother maintains an intent

363. Thus, she would be considered the natural mother even if she was improperly
implanted with someone else's genetic material and declares that she had no intent to
raise the child. In essence, the gestational mother becomes a parent by default unless the
genetic provider indicates an intent to parent the child.
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to parent the chird, both women will be the child's natural and legal mothers and
their rights will be determined as a custody issue under the second step of the
analysis.
The custody determination should be made through a modified best
interests analysis, which recognizes a presumption in favor of awarding primary
custody to the gestational mother because of the length of time in which the child
has bonded with the gestational mother while the parentage issue is litigated.
The genetic mother could overcome this presumption only by pointing to other
circumstances which would suggest that placement with the genetic mother is
in the child's best interests notwithstanding the length of time that the child has
bonded with the gestational mother.
Once primary custody is determined, the court should apply the best
interests analysis to determine what contact, if any, the child should have with
the other mother. This may result in a shared or joint custody arrangement if the
parties are able and willing to work together. More likely, however, the court
will allow only limited visitation by the non-custodial mother or, in some
circumstances, may provide only for communication between the two biological
mothers with the stipulation that the child would be informed of the other parent
at an appropriate time in the future and allowed to make contact on his or her
own if desired. In making these determinations, courts should consider whether
mediation will help provide an appropriate resolution. 3"
Although the intent + best interests analysis is subject to criticism because
it lacks the certainty of a bright-line declaration of parentage, 365 its strength is in

364. The Irvine, California, cases provide an excellent example. One genetic
mother whose eggs were misappropriated decided not to seek custody of the boy who
was born to another woman. Dodson, supra note 262, at B4. But she has established
contact with the birth parents and stated that she "expect[ed] to be part of his life when
his birth parents feel it is appropriate." Dodson, supranote 262, at B4. If this woman
had decided to formalize her rights through litigation, her case would be appropriate for
mediation because of her willingness to consider the child's best interests and the birth
parents' willingness to work with the genetic mother.
Loretta Jorge's case may be a candidate for mediation as well. Her attorney has
indicated that Mrs. Jorge's greatest motivation is the interests of the twins:
"Loretta ... knows her children eventually are going to know the story of their genesis
and find out who their biological mother is. She doesn't want them to think she never
tried to see them, especially since they live in the same neighborhood." Diane Seo, ExUCY PatientSeeks to Meet Twins Born to Someone Else, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1996, at
1, availablein 1996 WL 5242524. Although Mrs. Jorge has officially requested custody
or visitation, Smolowe & Weingarten, supra note 2, at 80, there is a possibility that she
would agree to something less if her real goal is only to ensure that her genetic offspring
do not think that she abandoned them.

365. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,782 n.10 (Cal.) (criticizing the dissent's
suggestion of best interests test because it "fosters instability" during the custody
litigation, as compared with a categorical test that could be mechanically applied to
determine
parentage and thereby avoids prolonged litigation), cert. denied,510 U.S. 874
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its flexibility. Rather than declaring the gestational mother to be the legal parent
in all circumstances (or expressing an opposite preference for the genetic parent),
the intent + best interests test recognizes that procreation and parentage is a
highly personal, individualized decision. We cannot assume that a gestational
mother will always want to parent the genetic child of another woman or that a
genetic mother whose eggs were harvested as much as a decade earlier still has
a desire to parent a child born from those eggs. The intent test, therefore,
legalizes the expectations of the parties rather than imposing an arbitrary
determination of parentage based upon a bright-line standard.366
The intent + best interests test also may be criticized for its suggestion that
both mothers should have legal standing if they both express the requisite intent
to parent the child. Admittedly, the concept of dual motherhood is contrary to
society's preference for the nuclear family. In addition, resolution of their
competing claims as a custody matter will require greater involvement by the
courts than would be required under a bright-line test that awards legal rights to
one mother and denies any standing to the other. But given the increasing
number of multi-parent families created by divorce, the concept of having two
sets of parents is not an extreme departure from today's norms.
More importantly, however, failure to grant legal status to both mothers is
unjust and unneccessary. Both women play a vital role in the birth of the child
and, given the strong divergent viewpoints on this issue, the American public is
unlikely to reach a concensus as to which mother should be granted parental
status while declaring the other to be persona non grata. Thus, instead of trying
to force this unique situation into the traditional one-mother cubbyhole, the
intent + best interests test respects the significant contributions of both women
and treats them both as legal parents. At the same time, the test recognizes that

the child's best interest isserved by having only one mother care for and nurture
the child on a daily basis. Instead of taking the draconian measure of cutting off
one mother's legal status altogether, however, the intent + best interests test
would grant one mother primary custody and determine what contact, if any,
with the other mother is appropriate under the circumstances of each particular
case.
In short, the intent + best interests test places the need for individual
treatment above the desire for absolute certainty as to parentage. Yet the test
maintains a considerable degree of stability because under the modified best

(1993).
366. A bright-line test declaring the genetic mother to be the natural mother, for
example, might impose parentage on a party that no longer desires to be a parent while
denying the right to a desiring genetic mother. The converse would be true for an
inflexible rule declaring the gestational mother to be the natural mother. To award
parental rights to the desiring party under these scenarios, the court would have to use
the more cumbersome process of state adoption laws to terminate the parental rights of
the natural mother as declared by the statutory rule and permit the desiring party to adopt
the child.
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interests analysis, the gestational mother would presumptively receive primary
custody because of the length of time that the child has bonded with her. Thus,
a woman who gives birth to a child ordinarily can be assured that she will
maintain custody of the child in the absence of unusual circumstances.
Unlike a bright-line standard, however, this test does not completely cut off
the interests of the genetic mother. Although she may not be able to enjoy all of
the pleasures of parenthood, she is allowed to maintain some connection with the
child, even if it is only the right to have the child be informed of her status as a
genetic parent sometime in the future. Perhaps more importantly, however, this
proposal gives her peace of mind by granting her some measure of legal standing
to ensure the well-being of her genetic offspring.367
The intent + best interest test, therefore, attempts to accommodate the needs
and interests of all parties. The mother who is granted primary custody will
enjoy most of the benefits of parenthood but must give up some privacy and
exclusivity in her parental rights in order to accommodate the needs of the other
mother. The non-custodial mother, on the other hand, is deprived of a close
relationship with the child but, in comparison with the current state of the law,
gains formal recognition of her role as a biological parent and her desire to
protect the child's welfare. Most importantly, however, the test ensures that the
predominant consideration in this process is the best interest of the child.
B. Incorporatingthe New Standardinto ExistingLaw
For states that have adopted the UPA, courts can adopt the intent + best
interest test without any further legislative action because, as discussed above,
the plain language of the Act suggests that both the gestational mother and the
genetic mother can establish maternity. 368 Some Courts already have suggested
that an intent test be used to break the tie between these two prospective mothers
in voluntary surrogacy cases.369 The intent + best interests analysis would

simply take that test one step further, recognizing that an intent analysis alone

367. In fact, public comments made by some of the couples involved in the Irvine,
California, fertility clinic scandal suggest that concern for the child's well-being is a
predominant consideration for many of the genetic parents. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note
262, at B4 (quoting one genetic mother as saying: "It was heartbreaking to learn... that
the child that I had hoped for, prayed for and suffered for was stolen from me and born
to another woman ....

I am comforted, however, to have learned that he has been

growing up in a family that loves him, has cared for him and provides a positive,
supportive home for him"); Kelleher & Christensen, supranote 3, at Al (quoting Basilio
Jorge as saying he felt a need to check out the gestational parents "to see if [the birth
father] can support the children"). Allowing a genetic mother to establish parental rights
also addresses Loretta Jorge's paramount concern that her twins would think she did not
care about them. See Kelleher & Christensen, supra note 3, at Al.
368. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
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would not resolve most disputes that arise from stolen or misdelivered genetic
material.
For purposes of clarity, however, it would be preferable for legislatures to
incorporate this test into their parentage statutes through a provision such as the
following:
A woman who gives birth to a child shall be presumed to be its
natural mother and listed as such on the child's birth certificate. This
presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that
the gestational mother received genetic material from another woman
without the latter's consent and that the genetic mother indicates her
intent to parent the child.
If both the gestational mother and genetic mother indicate an
intent to parent the child, both shall be declared the legal parents and
the court shall determine custody through a modified best interests
analysis. Under this analysis, the court shall presume that primary
custody should be awarded to the gestational mother, but this
presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that
placement with the genetic mother is in the child's best interests. A
substitute birth certificate may be issued upon a court order awarding
parental status to the genetic mother or to both mothers.
V. CONCLUSION

Modem reproductive technology has made it possible for a child to have
two biological mothers, one that provides the genetic material and one that
nurtures the developing fetus through pregnancy. Under current adaptations of
the law, however, only one of these women may be declared the child's legal
mother. Thus, when the two women have knowingly and voluntarily combined
efforts to produce a child, courts have fashioned categorical standards that award
parental rights to one of the mothers and totally deny parental status to the other.
Although these standards may be justifiable in the context of voluntary
surrogacies, they are inappropriate for cases in which a gestational mother is
implanted with the genetic material of another without the latter's consent. This
Article, therefore, suggests a two-part test to resolve parentage disputes in these
cases of involuntary surrogacy.
The first part of the test looks at the intent of the mothers. If only one of the
mothers expresses a desire to parent the child, the courts should recognize that
woman as the child's legal mother. If, on the other hand, both women
demonstrate an intent to parent the child, the law should recognize both as the
child's legal mothers and resolve their competing claims as a custody matter.
Because a gestational mother takes immediate possession of the baby upon birth
and will establish a significant bond with the child while a case is litigated, this
Article proposes a modified best interest test to determine custody. This test
would presume that it is in the child's best interests to award primary custody to
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the gestational mother, but would leave the door open for evidence to the
contrary. Courts should then determine what level of contact with the noncustodial mother, if any, is in the child's best interests.
In short, the time has come to accept the new reproductive reality and
recognize that, in this unique situation, a child can have two legal mothers, each
with some degree of parental rights. In many cases, the parental status of the
non-custodial mother may be extremely limited, the contact restricted only to
communication with the custodial mother until the child reaches adolescence.
But even this limited recognition and contact is preferable to the current system,
which awards legal rights to only one of the mothers and declares the other
persona non grata.

Obviously, the non-custodial mother will be disappointed that she cannot
enjoy all the pleasures of parenting. But giving her some legal standing should
address two of her other most significant concerns: (1) that her contribution to
the creation of this child is given appropriate respect; and (2) that she has at least
some legal means of ensuring that the child is well cared for by the custodial
mother. Moreover, it is hoped that at the bottom line, she will embrace the need
to put the child's best interests first. Indeed, as King Solomon so wisely
recognized in the most renowned maternity dispute of all,37 putting the child's
best interests first is one of the defining characteristics of being a parent.

370. 1 Kings 3:16-28. In this biblical story, two women claimed to be the mother
of an infant. Solomon resolved the dispute by ordering: "Divide the living child in two,
and give half to the one, and half to the other." When one of the women protested,
urging the King to give the child to the other woman to spare its life, the King altered his
command: "Give the living child to the first woman, and by no means slay it; she is its
mother."
Id.
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